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This study analyses the use of ‘fear’ in US presidential rhetoric as an active soft power 
strategy designed to achieve support mobilisation and maintenance for the Iraq War. A 
quantitative content analysis of the Weekly Radio Broadcasts of the President of the 
United States between January 2001 and January 2009 is conducted in order to study 
presidential rhetoric in isolation from the broader media framing of war discourse. Such 
analysis shows that ‘terror’ and the threat of WMDs were central elements in the creation 
of a rhetoric of fear, and that such elements were often juxtaposed with reference to a 
US role of promoting peace and security in the region within presidential rhetoric. This 
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study finds that in the highly sensitised environment the US found itself in following the 
September 11 2001 terror attacks, ‘fear’ proved to be a highly effective tool for 
mobilising public support for short-term policy initiatives. However, due to a lack of 
flexibility and adaptability, the rhetoric of fear as employed by President Bush was 
ineffective in overcoming a loss of credibility and legitimacy, therefore proving 
ineffective as a mechanism for achieving long-term support maintenance amongst the 
US population. Thus, this study suggests that rhetoric strategies for successful for long-
term support maintenance require elements of adaptability and verifiability, which are 
not essential in achieving initial support mobilisation. 
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Despite assuming the role of global hegemon and maintaining a distinct competitive 
advantage in terms of military power the United States has failed to achieve clear success 
in a war since World War II (Cypher, 2015; Ward, 2018). In confronting the issue of 
why this phenomenon has arisen many scholars point to the changing nature of modern 
warfare rendering traditional military resources less effective. As stated by Arquila and 
Ronfeldt (1999), “the world of traditional power politics is typically about whose 
military or economy wins. Politics in an information age may ultimately be about whose 
story wins”. Thus, the importance of strategies appropriate to the modern age, whether 
these be termed as communication strategies, information campaigns, or soft power, is 
ever increasing. As noted by former British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, “even the 
best of diplomatic policies may fail if it neglects the task of interpretation and persuasion 
which modern conditions impose” (Wagnleitner, 1994, 50). 
It is in light of such circumstances that this research shall aim to address the competence 
of US soft power strategies in order to contribute to our understanding of the wider issue 
of why the US is struggling in modern conflicts. It will do so through an analysis of US 
presidential rhetoric on the Iraq War as employed by the Bush administration from 2001-
2009. This will be conducted through the specific analysis of how President Bush utilised 
a rhetoric of fear in weekly presidential radio broadcasts in order to address the question 
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of why the US was unable to maintain support for the campaign in Iraq, and how, as a 
democratic society, this potentially constrained presidential action and affected the 
campaign. Through such a process the research aspires to contribute to the discourse on 
soft power strategies and to aid in our understanding of the requirements for successful 
political and military campaigns in the information age. 
In the context this broader issue, this paper will address the following research questions: 
How was a rhetoric of fear created and utilised in George W. Bush’s presidential radio 
broadcasts and what were the implications of the utilisation of such rhetoric? 
How effective was the rhetoric of fear in mobilising and maintaining support for the 
Iraq War? 
As such two concepts will form the underlying framework of this research: soft power 
and framing, whilst further concepts such as securitisation and communications theories 
will also be incorporated into the analysis of President Bush’s rhetoric strategy. These 
concepts will be presented in chapter three. Chapter two will provide an in depth review 
of existing literature and studies relevant to this research. This includes reference to 
studies of framing, explanations for fluctuating levels of public support for the Iraq War, 
and research on presidential rhetoric which was particularly influential in directing the 
focus of this study. 
In addressing the question of how a rhetoric of fear was employed by the President 
quantitative content analysis has been employed to address levels of fearful rhetoric 
3 
along with the composite elements contributing to the formation of such rhetoric. This 
will be introduced in more detail in chapter five and the results will be presented in 
chapter six. As such, chapter five will address the question of how the rhetoric of fear 
was constructed and utilised in presidential radio broadcasts whilst chapter six will 
address the implications and effects of this for mobilising and maintaining public support 
levels and consequently for the legitimacy and credibility afforded to the Bush 
administration.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
This chapter will review existing literature relevant to this study. It shall start by offering 
a brief overview of the background leading up to the Iraq War in order to help situate 
this research. Then literature covering explanations for why the US has struggled in 
modern conflicts including the war on terror will be briefly presented before moving to 
examine previous studies on framing and the Iraq War. The latter section will be further 
divided into the presentation of studies covering media framing of the campaign and 
those regarding official frames of the Bush administration. Finally the chapter will be 
concluded by discussing explanations for the fluctuating levels of support for the war 
amongst the American public. 
 
1. Background to the Iraq War 
 
Before moving to analyse the rhetoric used by President Bush towards the campaign in 
Iraq as a part of the greater ‘War on Terror’, it is necessary to layout the context and 
background against which such rhetoric was used. This section therefore, will aim to 
provide such background through first providing an overview of the Iraq War including 
major events and issues arising within the duration of President Bush’s terms in office. 
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The Iraq war can be considered a highly significant event during Bush’s presidency. The 
war itself can be broken into two main phases; the initial invasion in 2003, a brief, 
conventional war in which a US led coalition force overthrew the Iraqi regime headed 
by Saddam Hussein, and a subsequent occupation of Iraq involving defending against 
counter-insurgency operations as the US attempted to install a democratic government 
sympathetic to the US (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). The war continued for the 
duration of Bush’s presidency, although following a decrease in levels of violence from 
2007 onwards, the levels of US troop deployed in the country gradually reduced and in 
December 2011 the US formally completed its withdrawal from Iraq under President 
George W. Bush’s successor, President Barak Obama. 
Following the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been under sanctions 
from the United Nations (hereinafter UN) in order to restrain future Iraqi aggression and 
prevent the progress of Iraqi munitions programs (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
Despite such measures, inspections throughout the 1990s suggested that Iraq was in 
violation of the UN weapons ban, leading US President Bill Clinton to order the strategic 
bombing of several Iraqi military installations in 1998. Following this operation however, 
the Iraqi regime refused to reopen its borders to inspectors. Thus, in 2002, following the 
September 11 terror attacks of the previous year, President George W. Bush argued that 
the US was vulnerable to future such attacks posed by the likes of Iraq in light of the 
latter's alleged weapons of mass destruction (hereinafter WMD) programs and links to 
and support for terrorist groups including al Qaeda, the group responsible for the 
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September 2001 attacks. Bush therefore argued that disarming Iraq, removing Saddam 
Hussein, and installing a democratic government sympathetic to US interests in his place 
was a priority for ensuring US security, regional stability in the Middle East, and greater 
global peace (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
Further UN Resolutions in 2002 required that Iraq admit inspectors into the country in 
order to assess its compliance with previous resolutions regarding its WMD programs, 
and Iraq appeared to comply with these demands. President Bush however, along with 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, stated that Iraq was not in full compliance with these 
inspections and was concealing WMDs or their development programs. Whilst other 
nations were in favour of trusting in Iraqi compliance with inspections and giving 
inspectors time to fully assess whether or not Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions, in 
2003 the US along with a ‘coalition of the willing’, supported mainly by the United 
Kingdom, declared an end to diplomatic efforts and gave Iraq an ultimatum; Saddam 
Hussein had 48 hours to leave the country or the US would use force to end his regime 
and disarm Iraq (The Economist, 2003; The Guardian, 2003).  This ultimatum faced 
strong criticism from other nations including notably US NATO allies in France and 
Germany (BBC News, 2003). 
Upon the failure of Iraq to meet this ultimatum, the US launched its military campaign 
with an aerial attack on the morning of March 20th 2003. This was followed by a ground 
invasion a few days later. The initial stage of combat operations in Iraq was very brief, 
with US forces taking control of the capital Baghdad on April 9th 2003 and announcing 
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an end to major combat operations and a US victory over Hussein’s regime on May 1st 
2003. Saddam Hussein was captured by US forced in December 2003 and turned over 
to Iraqi authorities for trial in June 2004. He was executed for his crimes, including 
counts of crimes against humanity, on December 30th 2006 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2019). 
Following the collapse of Hussein’s regime the US undertook the task of restoring law 
and order to the country in light of severe outbreaks of violence and looting targeted 
mainly at government offices and public institutions. Continued attacks against 
occupying forces developed into full guerrilla warfare which compounded existing 
economic and infrastructural obstacles to rebuilding the country. Despite low initial 
casualty levels, deaths of US troops increased rapidly during this period reaching 
roughly one thousand by the 2004 US presidential elections and three thousand by 2007 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
By late 2006 violence levels in Iraq were at an all-time high. To combat this in January 
2007 Bush announced the ‘Surge’- the deployment of an additional 20,000 American 
troops to Iraq with the goal of “put[ting] down sectarian violence and bring[ing] security 
to the people of Baghdad” (The White House Bush Archives, 2007). By September 2007 
however, Bush announced a reduction in troop numbers in Iraq from 169,000 to 130,000 
following General Petraeus’ report of the progress of the Surge earlier that month. 
However, despite such reports of progress and a reduction in troop levels 2007 was the 
deadliest year for US troops in the entire duration of the War (Singal et al., 2010). By 
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2008 however, despite on-going insurgency activities, the situation on the ground in Iraq 
appeared to be improving with levels of violence and troops deaths lower than 2007 
levels. Following this gradual decline in violence levels in Iraq and reductions in US 
troop levels the war continued to wind down with the US announcing the complete 
withdrawal of remaining military personnel from the country under Bush’s successor, 
President Barak Obama in October 2011 (BBC News, 2011a). The last US troops were 
withdrawn on December 18th 2011 (Jaffe, 2011). 
 
2. Why the US Can’t Win: the New Media Ecology & Modern 
Warfare 
 
This study is conducted against the backdrop of the broader question of why the US has 
struggled to achieve success in recent conflicts. As such, before looking specifically at 
studies of President Bush’s approaches to the Iraq War as part of the broader War on 
Terror it is necessary to evaluate more general explanations for this overarching question. 
A broad explanation for why the US cannot win wars rests on the changing nature of 
warfare in the modern age. Characteristics of this change include the increase in civil 
conflicts and the declining legitimacy of the use of military force as a consequence of 
the post-1945 strengthening of norms against aggression (Kaldor, 2014, 376). Civil 
conflicts have constituted over 90% of recent conflicts and create a myriad of problems 
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including difficulty distinguishing enemy militants from civilians, the lack of a clear end 
to conflicts, and meaning it is often no longer enough to simply defeat the opponent on 
the battlefield as this may lead to a power vacuum thus resulting in further insurgencies, 
instability, and ultimately continuation of the conflict (Ward, 2018). Such possibilities 
mean that US forces must be committed to long-term stabilisation and nation-building 
activities in order to achieve success – something they are often either unwilling or 
unequipped to do. The Iraq War provides an excellent example of this as what originated 
as a conventional military campaign to achieve regime change devolved into civil war 
and a long-term occupation. Arguably, it was during the occupation and consequent 
long-term support maintenance efforts that the US struggled. 
A second problem for the US in modern warfare is the conflict between politics and 
military decision making. Clausewitz (1918) stated, “war is merely the continuation of 
politics by other means” but for the United States this has become more of a curse than 
a blessing as it has allowed political, short-term considerations to obstruct the formation 
of calculated, strategic decisions. Moreover, political pressures make leaders feel the 
need to be seen to be doing something, especially in the face of terrorist groups or those 
believed to support them, which has led the US to attempt to take out such “bad guys” 
even in absence of a coherent plan for subsequent stabilisation of the region. As such, a 
changing environment and failure of the US to adapt to meet such new requirements 
coupled with the US belief that it has a duty as the global hegemon to become involved 
in regional conflicts and instability have been considered contributing factors to the US 
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military failings in recent decades (Ward, 2018).  The extent to which such short-term 
political considerations may have affected decision making regarding the Iraq War and 
presidential rhetoric regarding it will be explored in chapter six. 
Under this new media ecology conflicts are becoming less about military capabilities 
and more about the use of softer strategies and effective communication strategies. This 
is something that US adversaries including terrorist groups know well but that the US 
has failed to fully grasp rather viewing such activities as “support functions of kinetic 
activity” (Taylor, 2010, 153). Taylor (2010, 163) asserts that terrorists know that their 
activity is 10% violence and 90% publicity, whereas US responses in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have been 90% violence and 10% strategic communications. It is not only directly 
in dealing with the war on terror that the US has failed to appropriately apply soft power 
strategies. Polls show that even some of the more moderate Islamic countries have 
indicated a belief that the US poses a bigger threat to world peace than Bin Laden and 
that following headlines stating “we are all Americans” there was actually an increase in 
anti-American sentiment (Taylor, 2010, 153). Further studies show that it is not only 
Islamic countries but also traditional allies of the US such as Germany and France that 
have shown increasing levels of anti-Americanism following the proposal and initiation 
of the military campaign in Iraq; this despite heightened sympathies for the US following 
the 9/11 attacks (Pew Research Centre, 2008). 
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3. Framing & the Iraq War 
 
This section will address the existing literature regarding framing of the Iraq War. It will 
be divided into two further subsections, the first of which shall address media framing 
of the Iraq War, whilst the second shall address official government rhetoric and framing 
of the war. 
 
3-1. Media Framing & the Iraq War 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on US communications strategies and framing 
of the war in Iraq with various conclusions reached regarding the shortcomings of the 
US ranging from a divergence in official government framing with the frames most 
commonly supported in the media (Speer, 2017), suggestions that framing and rationale 
may be influential at the start of a military campaign but that in the following period it 
is volume of media coverage rather than such factors which are influential in public 
opinion and support (Coe, 2012), or that fragmentation of media along political 
divergences means that the public often accesses only those frames which conform to 
their pre-existing views (Muddiman et al., 2014). 
In the build-up to war and in the initial phases of the conflict, media coverage was found 
to closely echo the official lines of the Bush administration with critical view generally 
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omitted or downplayed. Dimaggio notes the Bush administration’s contribution to and 
harnessing of the climate of fear rife within the United States following the September 
11 terror attacks. By encouraging and utilising such sentiment, the administration was 
able to create an atmosphere of fear under which the public became highly susceptible 
to calls for action in Iraq in a way which would not have been possible prior to the attacks. 
The media also played an important role in amplifying this rhetoric of fear in part due to 
the heavy reliance journalist placed on official sources from both parties, rather than 
offering critical analysis or independently challenging pro-war views, or employing 
diversified sources in discussing the war (Dimaggio, 2015, 72). Thus, much of what 
Americans saw and heard was socially constructed by political officials (Dimaggio, 2015, 
107; Mitchell & Hulse, 2002). 
Howard Kurtz, former editor of the Washington Post, reported that from August 2002 to 
March 2003, the paper published more than 140 front page stories heavily emphasising 
the administration’s rhetoric whilst stories questioning the administration’s claims were 
relegated to the back pages of the paper (Dimaggio, 2015, 75; Finnegan, 2006). Even 
those news sources which questioned whether the US should immediately go to war did 
not question whether Iraq constituted a direct threat to the United States that must be 
dealt with at some stage – the question was with the timing of the proposed action rather 
than with the information or proposal itself (Dimaggio, 2015, 73). Furthermore, research 
has suggested that increased reporting of alleged terrorist threats was associated with 
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increased public support for the Bush administration (Dimaggio, 2015, 75; Nacos et al, 
2011). 
Along with compliance with the administrations rhetoric, a Center for International 
Security Studies analysis of pre-war coverage concluded that reporting failed to 
distinguish between WMD programs and actual WMDs and that there was a distinct lack 
of critical examination of the ways in which officials framed the events, issues, threats, 
and policy options in the build up to the Iraq war (Dimaggio, 2015, 78; Moeller, 2004). 
Moreover, the alleged associations between al Qaeda and Iraq were regularly repeated 
in the media which accepted without question the administration’s assertion that the two 
were linked (Dimaggio, 2015, 79). Fox news went so far as to suggest that anyone 
challenging the narrative linking Iraq and terrorism were “disloyal Americans” and anti-
war views were framed as extreme and posing a threat to national security thus further 
discrediting and repressing such views (Dimaggio, 2015, 80; O’Reilly, 2003). As such, 
media compliance and repetition of the government narrative, along with the repression 
and de-legitimisation of opposing views, were highly influential elements in the success 
of Bush’s framing of Iraq and in winning support for his war policies (Dimaggio, 2015, 
90; Finnegan, 2006). 
From 2004 to 2005 media reports widely conceded that Iraq did not possess WMDs and 
discussion of the lack of apparent link between Iraq and al Qaeda also became more 
common during this period (Dimaggio, 2015, 102; BBC News, 2003b). Public response 
to this showed a decline in support for the war among Americans (Dimaggio, 2015, 102-
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3). Moreover, as the occupation continued regular coverage of negative events such as 
growing levels of violence, the Abu Ghraib prison controversy, and the failure to find 
evidence of WMDs further stoked public hostility and opposition to the war (Dimaggio, 
2015, 106). Speer (2017, 282) further elaborated on this finding in a study of New York 
Times coverage of the War between 2005 and 2006, concluding that “journalists avoided 
the preferred frame of the White House whilst amplifying the preferred frame of the 
military.” Thus, we can see that the role of media in promoting or criticising government 
rhetoric was extremely influential in affecting support levels for the war and the 
president’s handling of it. 
Further studies have found that during the US occupation of Iraq rationales for war 
presented in the media did not have a substantial impact on public attitudes towards the 
campaign. Suggested explanations for this include that rather, such rationales may be 
influential in the early stages of a campaign rather that in the latter stages as “once the 
war has progressed for some time, people’s attitudes crystallize, and they tend to 
interpret new information about the war as supportive of their pre-existing attitudes” 
(Coe, 2012, 500; Gaines et al., 2007). This crystallisation of viewpoints can be further 
explained by the fragmented nature of American mass media where when “faced with 
partisan media, audiences gravitate towards messages matching with their political 
beliefs” (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Klapper, 1960; Muddiman et al., 2014; Stroud, 2011). 
Thus, during the latter stages of the war media reporting can be considered to have 
reinforced existing views rather than moulding public perceptive. With regards to the 
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Iraq War however this was not considered unanimous by all studies, as other studies 
suggest that the American public displayed significant independence from political 
parties with public opposition preceding party opposition (Dimaggio, 2015, 156). 
The lack of effectiveness of such frames was further explained due to the changing 
public attitudes about specific rationales over the course of the War. For example, Coe 
cites the rationale of ‘threat’, with polling data showing that whilst in December 2003 
62% of American’s felt that the war had contributed to US security, by December 2004 
only 51% of the American public still held that view (Coe, 2012, 501). Thus, if public 
threat perception is decreasing, repeating usage of such frames are unlikely to drive 
public support. As such, studies have concluded that if media coverage does influence 
public support levels this may be through mechanisms other than the rationales offered 
in their coverage. Rather, the sheer quantity of coverage and the patriotism such coverage 
stirs in the American public may be more significant factors in influencing public support 
(Coe, 2012, 501; Althaus & Coe, 2011). 
 
3-2. Official Government Framing & the Iraq War 
 
Whilst some studies suggest that the media was influential in framing the war through 
their level of alignment with government rhetoric, much discourse also suggests that it 
was the Bush administration who effectively manipulated news coverage in their favour 
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during the campaign in order to convince the American public of the need to invade Iraq 
and displace Saddam Hussein (Fritz et al., 2004; Isikoff & Corn, 2006; Rich, 2006). This 
suggests however, that regardless of the mechanism or direction of influence Presidential 
rhetoric, working in synchronisation with media reporting, was a force for support 
mobilisation for the Iraq War. Thus, this section shall examine the existing literature on 
presidential framing and rhetoric in the Iraq War. 
Studies note that from the outset, Bush’s rhetoric relating to Iraq was extremely one 
sided claiming the regime possessed WMDs and ties to terrorist organisations (Dimaggio, 
2015, 59). Dimaggio demonstrates that in the lead up to, and initial phases of Bush’s 
Iraq campaign there were several factors synergised to cultivate the high levels of 
support seen between 2002 and 2004, namely: fearful messages, a compliant media, and 
a susceptible public which already shared such fears of terrorism following the attacks 
of September 11th 2001 (Dimaggio, 2015; Roberts, 2005). This indicates that Bush’s 
rhetoric was effective in moulding public opinion in the War on Terror with public 
support for the war increasing by 12% following Bush’s September 11 anniversary and 
UN speeches (Dimaggio, 2015; Nacos et al, 2011). 
Major government frames identified in previous studies include fear, including the war 
on terror, hope or democracy building and the role of the United States to promote peace 
and stability around the world, and the Iraq civil war as shown in figure 1 (below). 
Moreover, further studies note that the insurgency frame which was given preference in 
media coverage during the occupation of Iraq was the frame promoted by the US military, 
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in contrast with the war on terror frame preferred by the White House (Dimaggio, 2015; 
Speer, 2017, 283). Whilst the War on Terror Frame promoted the conflict in Iraq as part 
of a wider struggle against terrorism and was used in justification for the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, the Insurgency Frame rather portrayed events during the occupation as acts of 
violence by domestic ‘insurgency’ groups against Iraqi and coalition forces (King  & 
Wells, 2009; Michaels, 2010; Speer, 2017; Wolfe, 2008). Other frames identified by 
previous studies include a ‘danger of civil war’ frame, a frame promoted initially by 
American scholars from 2005 onwards but later adopted by some Democratic senators 
and military officials, and an ‘occupation’ frame, however this was primarily adopted 
by anti-war activists rather than government or military officials (Feldman, 2006; Lakoff, 
2006; Michaels, 2010; Speer, 2017). It has been noted that when it comes to framing of 
facts and events, what is omitted can at times be more telling and more significant that 
what it included (Entman, 1993, 54). This is particularly notable for Bush’s ‘civil war’ 
frame, as this was framed rather as sectarian violence and direct reference to civil war 
was for a large part absent from presidential discourse on the War, and direct references 




Figure 1: Themes of Presidential Rhetoric on Iraq (Source: Dimaggio, 2015, 81) 
Speeches in 2002 and the early years of the war were framed in ways to place emphasis 
on “terror” and “fear” as dominant themes and to create a sense of urgency, imminent 
threat, and need for preventive action in the minds of the US population. In an October 
2002 Cincinnati speech Bush spoke of Iraq as a “grave threat” to peace and warned that 
this threat would only increase with time (Dimaggio, 2015, 60). This rhetoric of fear and 
terror was increased by attempts to link Iraq with terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda 
and responsibility for the September 11th attacks, with 48 references linking Iraq with al 
Qaeda made in that speech and a further 33 references in the 2003 State of Union address 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 63). In fact, Dimaggio states that “the campaign to sell the war was 
strategically calculated to begin the day after the one-year anniversary of September 11.” 
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The timing further suggests a desire to convey a link between Iraq and the September 11 
attacks and to manipulate the heightened emotions and sensitivity of the US public to 
terror threats in the wake of such a catastrophe (Dimaggio, 2015, 62). 
In juxtaposition to the rhetoric of fear directed towards Iraq, another significant element 
of official framing was the provision of hope to the US public and the belief that the 
president would act to protect them against terrorism and such enemies. Bush’s ‘hope 
campaign’ is divided into three pillars: firstly, hope that the United States will “defend 
the world from danger” and work for the peace and defence of the world. Secondly, the 
importance of human rights, and framing Hussein as committing crimes against 
humanity for which the United States will punish him and save countless innocent 
civilians from such fates. Third and finally, is the hope of democracy building, thus 
preventing such future atrocities (Dimaggio, 2015, 83). However, themes stressing 
democracy and human rights were less emphasised in both presidential rhetoric and 
media reporting, compared with those of WMDs and terrorism. Despite this, such themes 
did increase in salience in presidential rhetoric once it had become clear that no WMDs 
would be found (Dimaggio, 2015, 81). As such, over the period of the US occupation of 
Iraq, following the acceptance that the discovery of WMDs would be unlikely and under 
increasing doubt as to the accuracy of claims linking Iraq to al Qaeda, Bush’s rhetoric 
shifted between the rhetoric of fear and terrorism and democracy building and hope 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 105). 
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Despite figures suggesting the success of presidential rhetoric in selling the war to the 
American people there have been some studies countering this viewpoint. Some scholars 
assert that most Americans believed that Iraq had ties with al Qaeda before the onset of 
Bush’s campaign, suggesting presidential rhetoric was not as influential as first thought 
in selling the war. Similar arguments also question the role of the media in influencing 
public support for the war on the same grounds that the public needed no convincing of 
connections between Iraq and terrorism (Dimaggio, 2015, 95; Althaus & Largio, 2004). 
This conclusion however, has been criticised on the basis of the logic behind the Bush 
administration commitment of tremendous amounts of energy to selling a war to a public 
that “needed no convincing” and with reference to fluctuating levels of support for the 
war between 2002 to 2003, coinciding with congressional pushback and the fluctuation 
in the Bush administrations control over political-media discourse (Dimaggio, 2015, 95; 
Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Nacos et al, 2011). Nonetheless, such remarks do 
highlight the importance of audience priming or the susceptibility levels of an audience 
to a certain frame or rhetoric, such as the disposition of American’s to believe in another 
imminent terrorist threat following the September 11 attacks (Iyengar et al., 1982). 
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4. Fluctuations in Domestic Public Support Levels for the Iraq 
War 
 
Bush’s approval ratings along with domestic public support for the Iraq War fluctuated 
from majority support during the president’s first term in office and the preliminary 
stages of the war, to some of the lowest approval ratings and majority opposition to the 
war by the end of his second term in office in 2009 (Newport, 2008). This section will 
aim to first present an overview of the trends in public opinion before presenting the 
conclusions of existing literature on why such a fluctuation in support levels and eventual 
majority opposition to the war occurred. 
 
4-1. Trends in Public Opinion 
 
For the most part the war was viewed critically by the international community including 
overwhelmingly negative public opinion in both Europe and the Middle East. According 
to some reports, many in the Middle East viewed the campaign as a new form of anti-
Islamic, western imperialism and thus opposed the occupation of Iraq by foreign forces 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019; Pew Research Centre, 2008; Taylor, 2010, 153). 
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In the US however, public opinion was for the most part supportive of the campaign at 
its outset. Polls revealed considerable support for military action in Iraq both in the pre-
war period and during the initial invasion (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019; Rosentiel, 
2008). Opinion polls reveal pre-war public sympathies for Bush’s Iraq agenda and a 
significant increase in support for the invasion by early 2003. Fluctuations in public 
support have been attributed to presidential rhetoric and media coverage, with evidence 
that core arguments of Bush’s framing of the campaign were receiving majority support 
by late 2002 to early 2003 (Dimaggio, 2015, 91). Growth in support for the war effort in 
early 2003 coincided with Bush’s renewed dominance over political-media discourse, 
suggesting that public attitudes are often the product of citizens responding to changes 
in the informational environment (Dimaggio, 2015, 92). 
Following the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, the view that the war was 
“worth fighting” grew from 45% on December 13 2003 to 53%. Furthermore, approval 
of Bush’s handling of the war increased from 46% in November 2003 to 57% in January 
2004 (Dimaggio, 2015, 122; Polling Report). By June 2004 however, support for the war 
had fallen once again to 46% making 2004, all in all, a landmark year for the war with 
some of the highest monthly US casualties (BBC News, 2011b). 
By 2004-2005 Bush was failing to justify the war, and from 2005 to 2007 Americans 
reached a turning point (Dimaggio, 2015, 102). Most Americans had grown tired of the 
war after just a few years, and figures suggest that majority support for withdrawal 
emerged as early as 2004 to 2005. Figures from 2008 suggest that by that time, despite 
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the president celebrating a decline in violence in Iraq following the 2007 ‘surge’ 
initiative, moral opposition to the war had reached a majority of the population, and most 
Americans felt not only that the war was a mistake but also that the president had misled 
the public on the reasons for the war (Dimaggio, 2015, 111). By April 2008 63% of 
American reported considering the War to be a mistake, an increase from 23% of 
Americans in March 2003, and 41% in June 2004. Thus, as the war continued, and its 
related costs and casualties increased, America experienced emerging mass opposition 
to the war, directly contrasting to the mass support seen for the war in the early days of 
the campaign (Dimaggio, 2015, 105). 
Many Americans opposed to the war felt that President Bush was mishandling the 
occupation of Iraq and thus criticisms of the Bush administration began to increase. 
Media coverage and exposition of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal further damaged the 
US and Bush’s public image and altered public perceptions of the war both at home and 
abroad (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Further harming public approvals for the 
president and the war were the results of the September 11th Commission report which 
revealed that there was no evidence of collaboration between Hussein’s regime and al 
Qaeda – a central element of Bush’s case for war prior to the initiation of combat 
operations. Thus, this revelation combined with the failure to find evidence of Iraqi 
WMDs by US forces strongly contributed to increasing opposition to the war by the US 
public. Thus, this suggests that evidence of Bush’s manipulation information in making 
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the case for war was a central element stoking public opposition to the war, and reducing 
public support levels for President Bush. 
For the most part, initial support for the war was not split along party lines, with many 
on the left supporting the use of force in Iraq due to their opposition to perceived human 
rights violations committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Conversely, there were those 
from the right wing who viewed the campaign as “reckless internationalism” and 
evidence of US global overstretch and acting as the world’s policeman (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2019). Partisan differences in support levels increased however as the US 
occupation of Iraq continued with Democratic support for the President’s handling of 
the war decreasing well before, and to a greater extent than Republican support. By June 
2007 however, even Republican support for Bush’s handling of the war had dropped, 
with 38% of Republicans polled opposing the war (Singal et al, 2010). 
Initially media dominance worked to the advantage of the Bush administration in selling 
their narrative of events and framing Iraq in such a way as to incite support for US 
military intervention in the country. However, when the extent to which intelligence had 
been manipulated became public knowledge this constituted a major blow for the Bush 
campaign, discrediting presidential rhetoric and adding fuel to the campaigns of those 
criticising the war effort, thus increasing the rate of public opposition to the Bush 
administration and the war in Iraq. Such movements were only further stoked by the 
President’s later admission that there was no evidence linking the Iraqi government and 
al Qaeda and that Saddam Hussein had not been involved in planning the September 11 
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attacks (Dimaggio, 2015, 68; Frick, 2008; Mount, 2008; Shepard, 2003). When asked 
the question of whether the Bush administration deliberately misled the public about the 
Iraq threat, 43% of US respondents felt that it had in October 2003 and when this 
question was put forward again in December 2005 that percentage had increased to 52% 
showing an increasing lack of trust in the administration (Dimaggio, 2015, 69). 
 
4-2. Casualty Levels & Attentiveness to Political-Media Discourse 
 
A relationship is evident between reporting and public opinion. An individual level 
analysis reveals that individuals paying close attention to the political-media discourse 
on Iraq were more supportive of the war. Furthermore, close attention to presidential 
rhetoric was accompanied by a 15% increase in support for the war (Dimaggio, 2015, 
96; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005). Attention to Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address 
produced growing acceptance that Iraq had ties with al Qaeda and that it possessed 
WMDs, increasing support for the president’s handling of Iraq, for taking military action, 
and for the use of ground troops, coupled with increased opposition to further inspections 
in Iraq (Dimaggio, 2015, 96; DiMaggio, 2010, 247). 
From early 2003 onwards, war support increased noticeably among those following 
political-media discourse on Iraq. Those attentive to such discourse were more likely to 
view Iraq as a threat, to associate terrorist fears with Iraq, and to support military action 
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by margins of between 7-20% more than those inattentive to political-media discourse 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 98). Moreover, in May 2003 when President Bush delivered his 
“mission accomplished” speech his approval rating stood at 72%. The speech announced 
that “major combat operations have ended” and that “in the battle of Iraq, the United 
States and our allies have prevailed” (The White House Archives, 2003). Such a 
combination of rhetorical appeals to fear and democracy, absent of major criticism 
within US domestic media, were effective in cultivating public support for the war 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 121). Attention to news on Iraq during the elections in the period 
following the removal of Saddam Hussein produced a reduction in support for the 
withdrawal of US troops from the country due to the seemingly positive nature of a 
democratic election coupled with a reduction in levels of criticism within the media 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 132). 
However, the failure to find WMDs and consequent shift in reporting in 2004-2005 
harmed Bush’s credibility, with the relationship between those paying attention to 
reporting that no WMDs were found and the likelihood of opposing the war or voting 
against the president in the 2004 elections showing statistical significance (Dimaggio, 
2015, 103 & 126; DiMaggio, 2010, 248). Thus, public opposition to the war increased 
during periods when reporting of violence was growing and decreased in periods when 
reporting was dominated by the official rhetoric of the Bush administration (Dimaggio, 
2015, 115; DiMaggio, 2010). This correlation between increased criticism of Bush’s 
handling of the Iraq War and a divergence in media framing with official rhetoric 
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regarding the war suggests that increased public attentiveness to political-media 
discourse on the War was a factor affecting public opinion on the war. Moreover, studies 
show that between 2003 and 2007, the period during which the majority of war dissent 
emerged, reporting paid greater attention to growing casualty levels even if this meant 
clashes with the Bush administration’s framing of progress in the campaign (Dimaggio, 
2015, 113). Growing violence fostered increased dissent to the war, and caused 
American’s to rethink their commitment to the occupation of Iraq (Dimaggio, 2015, 114). 
Thus it is evident that attention to reporting combined with shifts in focus of media 
coverage to include increased coverage of casualty levels or increasing violence were 
significant factors in influencing public sentiment for the war. 
 
4-3. Partisan Pressures & Support Levels 
 
Along with the influence of attentiveness to media discourse on public opinion, several 
studies have also analysed the effects of partisan pressures on public support for the war 
(Aday, 2010; Feldman et al., 2012; Muddiman et al., 2014). Increased public 
attentiveness to political-media discourse on Iraq, in the period of late 2002 when there 
was a decline in Bush’s dominance over reporting, was correlated with growing 
opposition to Bush’s agenda among Democrats and Independent voters, although no 
influence was recorded on the support levels amongst Republicans (Dimaggio, 2015, 97; 
Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). 
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Muddiman et al., (2014, 215) examined the relationship between exposure to partisan 
programming and opinions on the Iraq War and found that due to the fragmented nature 
of the media, audiences are drawn to those messages which reflect their pre-existing 
viewpoints. As such, media coverage may work to reinforce existing viewpoints rather 
than challenging and shaping audience opinions. Moreover, those following different 
media outlets coverage of the same issue of event may come away with very different 
perspectives of the issue due to the agenda setting nature of partisan media outlets 
(Muddiman et al., 2014). For example, one study found that in 2004 those following Fox 
News coverage were more likely to consider terrorism as an important problem than 
those following the war coverage on CNN or MSNBC (Muddiman et al., 2014, 217; 
Stroud, 2011). Therefore, due to this partisan exposure it was independent voters, rather 
than individuals identifying specifically with one political party, who were more 
susceptible to influence by media coverage (Muddiman et al., 2014, 219; Iyenar & 
Kinder, 1987). 
Within the US government initial support for the war was distinctly bipartisan in both 
the House and the Senate (Jacobsen, 2010, 590). This changed rapidly however, as the 
legitimacy of the war began to be called into question with no evidence of WMDs or 
links to al Qaeda found. Thus Democratic opposition to the war and President Bush’s 
handling of it began to grow (Jacobsen, 2010, 591; Jacobsen 2011). As the war continued 
into Bush’s second term support for the President’s handling of the war began to drop 
even amongst Republican congressmen (Jacobsen, 2007; Jacobsen, 2010, 591). 
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Figure 2: Partisan Support Levels for Iraq (Source: Jacobsen, 2010, 593) 
 
As with congressional support, there also existed majority public bipartisan support for 
the war at its outset due to the belief that Saddam Hussein shared in responsibility for 
the attacks on New York’s World Trade Center of September 2001 and that he could 
pose a direct threat to the US again if not effectively dealt with (Jacobsen, 2010, 591; 
Jacobsen, 2011, 110). At the start of Bush’s second term in office roughly 73% of self-
identified Republicans offered positive responses to questions regarding the Iraq War 
compared to just 16% of Democrats (Jacobsen, 2010, 592; Jacobsen, 2011). Thus it is 
clear that whilst initially partisan pressures do not appear to have been a major influence 
on support for the war, as the occupation continued and media reporting became 
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increasingly fragmented partisan divides became increasingly evident. Figure 2 shows 
the difference in support levels for the Iraq War between Republicans, Democrats and 
Independent Americans. Whist support levels amongst Republicans suffered only a 
slight decline, support levels amongst Democrats declined much more dramatically. 
 
4-4. Strategic & Moral Factors & Public Opinion 
 
With regards to considerations that may have influenced public support levels, strategic 
considerations, the importance of casualties, partisan pressures, and moral concerns have 
all been highlighted by past studies. This includes feelings that the war was unwinnable, 
concerns that the president had manipulated intelligence to support the arguments for 
war, growing moral opposition for the war itself, and feelings that it may even be unjust 
and illegal (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2010). Of these factors, Dimaggio concludes through 
regression analysis (see figure 3 below) that moral objections were the most important 
driver for opposition amongst the American public (Dimaggio, 2015, 106). The analysis 
further finds a statistically significant relationship between the belief that President Bush 
misled the public on WMDs and feelings that the war was unwinnable (Dimaggio, 2015, 
155). Primary drivers for such objections included civilian casualty levels, the number 
of Iraqi’s suffering under an increasingly violent occupation, and mass anger over the 
perceived deception and manipulation of intelligence by the Bush administration in 
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making the case for war, whilst secondary objections included US casualty levels and 
the perception that the war was unwinnable (Dimaggio, 2015, 153). 
Moral objections became increasingly articulated by the anti-war movement with 
objections centred on the following issues: that the Iraq war was imperialist and contrary 
to the interests of the Iraqi people, concerns that the US was motivated by a geopolitical 
interest in oil, claims that Bush misinformed or lied to the public about WMDs, claims 
that the war was illegal under international law, and anger because American troops and 
Iraqi civilians were killed (Dimaggio, 2015, 107). 
Moral objections were further fuelled by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in April 2004 
which was another blow to the credibility of the war effort. This scandal drew 
international attention, and US behaviour was labelled as illegal under international law 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 127; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004; United Nations, 
1984). In a speech on May 24th 2004 President Bush articulated his response to the 
scandal, relying heavily on the rhetoric of democracy with such language appearing 35% 
more often than fearful language (Dimaggio, 2015, 128; The White House, 2004). Some 
studies have suggested that Bush succeeded in blunting critical narratives in US 
discourse, while others suggested that discourse remained critical due to the visual nature 
of the scandal and the images appearing in the media (Dimaggio, 2015, 128; DiMaggio, 
2010). Nonetheless, the scandal undermined claims that the US was in Iraq for 




Figure 3: Regression analysis of moral & strategic factors affected war support levels (Source: 




In summary, President Bush framed the war as a part of the larger War on Terror and 
labelled Iraq as a direct and imminent threat due to alleged linked with al Qaeda and 
WMD programs and shared responsibility for the attacks of September 11th 2001. Whilst 
initially media coverage was closely aligned with official rhetoric, as the occupation 
progressed media coverage became increasingly critical of the war, and showed 
increasing coverage of instances of violence and casualty levels in Iraq which have been 
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found to show a statistically significant relationship with rising levels of opposition for 
the war. 
Legitimacy of the conflict was also increasingly a problem for the Bush administration. 
Whilst initial support levels were high, polls taken before the war suggest the possibility 
for even greater support had the war received support from the United Nations or major 
US allies (Jacobsen, 2010, 591; Jacobsen, 2011, 85). Moreover, as has been illustrated 
in this chapter increasing views that the war was illegitimate, immoral, and that the 
president had manipulated intelligence and deceived the public were key drivers of 
public opposition. 
With reference to framing and the shaping of attitudes with regards to the Iraq war, 
validations of both elite and democratic theory can be found, with public opinion lying 
somewhere between the two. Elite theory argues that political officials mould public 
opinion by framing events, thereby determining how individuals interpret events whilst 
democratic (or rational public) theory contends that events matter and that individuals 
are rational in that attention to real world events influences their beliefs. Evidence in past 
studies suggests that the reality is somewhere in between (Dimaggio, 2015, 155). 
Validating elite theory, at times Americans appeared to embrace the presidential rhetoric 
portraying Iraq as a threat, and US policy as humanitarian without considering 
alternative narratives. Conversely, validating democratic theory, the public displayed 
rationality by responding to the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq with 
increasingly negative news acting as a primary driver of war opposition despite 
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consistency in official framing of the war (Dimaggio, 2015, 106). As such, opposition 
to the war was driven most significantly by strategic and moral objections that the war 
was unwinnable and that casualty and violence rates were too high. 
Previous studies have thus provided a wealth of discourse on significant frames both in 
media and official rhetoric in discourse on the Iraq War and have investigated the 
relationship between various factors and audience support levels for the war. However, 
despite this wealth of research on the topic, the majorities of studies have focussed on 
the nexus between presidential rhetoric and media coverage rather than on presidential 
rhetoric itself as a specific strategy in the Iraq War. This research therefore is intended 
to address this issue, analysing presidential rhetoric in isolation from media coverage as 
a political-military strategy employed in the Iraq War. 
In the 2015 book ‘Selling War, Selling Hope’ Dimaggio highlights ‘fear’ as the central 
frame employed by the Bush administration towards the Iraq War. However, the way in 
which such a frame is created and employed, along with its direct influence on public 
support levels is not addressed in detail. As such, in addressing presidential rhetoric 
strategies in the Iraq War, this study has built upon the work of Dimaggio by taking the 
rhetoric of fear as the item of analysis. In such a way this research hopes to contribute to 
the existing literature by extending upon the existing findings and adding specific 
research on how such strategies were employed and to what effect. In such a way 
contributions can be made from a political science perspective to a body of research that 
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has to this point been dominated by communications studies in order to contribute to 
further evaluations of rhetoric strategy and related discourse.   
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III. Conceptual & Theoretical Frameworks 
 
This chapter will introduce the concepts that form the foundation of this study and thus 
will thus help situate the analysis of Presidential rhetoric in addressing the greater 
question of why the US has struggled in modern conflicts. There are two main concepts 
that will be introduced in this chapter. The first is the concept of soft power which will 
explain the selection of ‘rhetoric’ as an item of study, whist the second is framing which 
will address how and why such mechanics are influential in the sphere of domestic and 
international politics. 
 
1. Soft Power & Human Communications 
 
The backbone of this research will be founded on the concept soft power. As noted in 
the previous chapter, conflicts are about much more than which side has the superior 
military force and it is often no longer enough to simply defeat the opponent on the 
battlefield. Such truths are becoming even more pronounced in the modern information 
age where the war is no longer contained to the battlefield but is rather projected across 
the globe through the media. This creates increased potential for opposition, not only 
from the adversary but from third parties and even the domestic audience depending on 
how such coverage is received. As such, the concept of soft power has been applied here 
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for two reasons. The first is to address this nexus between soft and hard powers in 
conflicts in light of the effects of the increased scope of warfare in the modern 
information era, and the second is in order to facilitate a strategic understanding of the 
ways in which tools such as rhetoric and framing can be used by leaders as a part of the 
war-fighting strategy under such circumstances. 
Soft power rests on the culture, history, political values and foreign policy of a country 
however has become increasingly understood to have a diverse range sources and forms 
including norm diffusion, rhetoric and framing, agenda setting, strategic narratives, and 
other communicative or cultural tools (Kaldor, 2014; Nye, 2008, 96; Nye, 2014, 21; 
Rothman, 2011; Roselle et al, 2014). Specifically this research will apply the concept as 
revised by Rothman (2011) who reconceptualised power as a continuum spanning from 
the hardest forms of power (physical force) to the softest forms (rhetoric and framing)1. 
Such a conceptualisation allows for greater flexibility in the way in which different 
resources may be incorporated and defined within the power spectrum and thus may be 
more appropriate for application in conflict scenarios in which the distinction between 
soft and hard powers may not be clearly distinguishable (Rothman, 2011, 50). In terms 
of the softest forms of power, Rothman divides this into two subcategories: normative 
framing - the use of morals or emotions, and analytical framing - the generation of a 
story or narrative which may identify harm and victims, along with attribution of blame 
or responsibility (Rothman, 2011, 54-55). Both of these forms of framing can be 
                                                          
1 See appendix 1 
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identified in the Iraq War as President Bush plays highly on the morals and emotions of 
American’s in order to make his case for the war, but also clearly identifies victims and 
elements of narrative commonly seen in analytical framing in his discussion of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and terrorist leaders in Iraq. 
If power is understood as the ability to influence the actions and behaviour of others 
(Dahl, 1957; Nye, 2008; Nye, 2014; Rothman, 2011), soft power as first conceptualised 
by Joseph Nye is defined as “the ability to obtain a preferred outcome by attraction and 
persuasion rather than coercion and payment” (Nye, 2008, 95; Nye, 2014, 19). Since the 
term was first coined scholars have contributed their own revisions to soft power theory 
including the conceptualisation of soft power as the use of intangible resources (Lee, 
2009; Lee, 2010; Rothman, 2011) or as “the ability to create consensus around shared 
meaning” (Roselle et al., 2014, 72). Moreover, scholars have debated what constitutes 
soft power resources as means of producing soft power. Whilst Nye considered a 
country’s soft power to rest on its culture and history, political values, and foreign policy 
(Nye, 2008, 96; Nye, 2014, 21), other scholars have suggested more diverse sources 
including norm diffusion, rhetoric and framing, agenda setting, strategic narratives, and 
other communicative or cultural tools (Kaldor, 2014; Rothman, 2011; Roselle et al., 
2014). However, increasingly scholars have come to consider soft power discourse to 
place excessive emphasis on defining soft power and differentiating soft and hard power 
resources rather than focussing on the effects of such capabilities and their influences 
(Roselle et al., 2014, 71). Therefore, alongside providing insight into the US struggles 
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and the requirements of modern conflicts, this paper also hopes to contribute to the 
discourse on soft power through the analysis of President Bush’s ‘fear rhetoric’ as a 
specific political-military soft power strategy in order to offer a more practical insight 
into the effects and capabilities of soft power strategies in the modern age. 
In this information age one arena within which soft power can be applied is in conflicts 
or military campaigns. In military jargon, soft power can fall under a number of terms 
including; information campaigns, soft engagement, full spectrum dominance, hearts 
and minds operations, non-kinetic operations, influence operations, and media 
operations, and is often intended for the purpose of influencing a particular leadership, 
audience, or group in support of government policy. Such operations may influence 
whether targets groups become involved and how they will participate in the conflict 
(Taverner, 2010). Roselle et al., (2014) identify strategic narratives as a form of soft 
power and suggest specific applications for this in conflicts through influence on how 
situations, actors and behaviours interact and are understood. 
Furthermore, in discussing factors for effective soft power strategies Taylor (2010, 162) 
states that “strategic communications to be effective must be credible” and must assume 
a defensible policy, respectable identity, and core value. Similarly, in considering 
narratives as a central form of human communications scholars have identified 
plausibility and logic rather than verifiability as some of the most important components 
in presenting rational narratives for audience consumption (Fisher, 1984; Bruner, 1991). 
Bruner (1991, 10) further emphasises the importance of intension – why the story is told 
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and how it is interpreted as it is – in the construction of effective narratives. Fisher (1984) 
considers narrative both to act as a mode of social influence and through the narrative 
paradigm  to offer a conceptual framework and logic for “assessing ‘stories’ and 
determining whether one should adhere to the stories one is encouraged to endorse or to 
accept as the basis for decision and actions” (Fisher, 1985). Building upon assumptions 
of humans as rational actors Fisher further identifies narrative probability and fidelity as 
two core principles upon which to judge the merits of stories as forms of communication 
of social reality (Fisher, 1984; Fisher, 1985). As such, these components of effective 
narratives will be considered in the analysis of US soft power strategies within this study. 
 
2. Framing & Rhetoric 
 
Framing can be understood as the “selection of a restricted number of thematically 
related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed” 
(Weaver, 2007, 143). It is not however, merely limited to media usage. Rather, framing 
is relevant when anyone discusses anything and can have tremendous influence on how 
people react to and accept particular realities. Furthermore, frames can be commonly 
considered to be “tied in with culture as a macro societal structure” which is especially 
important for framing in issues such as the Iraq War where culturally significant 
elements can be utilised and highlighted in order to gain support for a certain course of 
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action (Weaver, 2007, 143). An example of this significant to this research would be the 
usage of freedom as a value of cultural importance in American society & therefore able 
to be utilised by the Bush administration to garner support for his initiatives in Iraq. 
Framing is commonly considered in terms of what aspects are highlighted and increased 
in salience within a particular text in order to promote a certain definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment of the item described (Entman, 1993, 52; 
Weaver, 2007, 143). By definition, by increasing the salience of certain bits of 
information about an item, those pieces of information are made more noticeable, 
meaningful, or memorable to audiences. In the process of framing, this can be achieved 
through placement or repetition, or by association of such information with culturally 
familiar symbols (Entman, 1993, 53). The frame therefore “determines whether most 
people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they 
evaluate and choose to act upon it”. As such, and as demonstrated by Kahneman & 
Tyersky’s experiments, frames call attention to particular aspects of the issue described 
whilst simultaneously directing attention away from other aspects (Kahneman & 
Tyersky, 1984). As such, “most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include” 
(Entman, 1993, 54). This directing of attention to certain aspects of a particular issue can 
therefore lead audiences to have different reactions. Within domestic politics we 
commonly see politicians competing with each other and the media over news frames in 
battles for public support (Entman, 1989; Riker, 1986; Entman, 1993, 55). Thus, frames 
can exert great social power especially once a certain frame has become widely accepted, 
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as subsequently to use another term or frame is to risk that the target audience will 
perceive the communicator as lacking credibility (Entman, 1993, 55; Gamson, 1992). 
This element was seen in the early stages of the Iraq War campaign, when Presidential 
rhetoric dominated media framing of the issue and thus any opposing or alternate frames 
were omitted from the discourse or relegated to the back pages of newspapers, thus 
decreasing the salience of such views (Dimaggio, 2015, 75). 
Entman further identifies four locations in the communication process of frames. These 
include the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. In this study these 
locations can be identified as the Bush Administration (the communicator), presidential 
radio broadcasts (the text), the US public (the receiver) and American values and norms 
(the culture). The role of these elements in the framing process are as follows; 
“communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgements in deciding what 
to say, guided by frames that organise their belief systems. The text contains frames, 
which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, 
stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically 
reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements. The frames that guide the receiver’s thinking 
and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention 
of the communicator. The culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames” (Entman, 
1993, 52). It is along this basis therefore, that this research has been conducted through 
the application of key word frequency analysis in examining the question of how 
President Bush used a rhetoric of fear in discussing the Iraq War. 
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As such, framing plays a significant role in affecting how people react to events or issues. 
This is especially important in the political setting where the democratic process is 
essentially a competition of different narrative frames working to garner support for a 
certain approach to an issue.  Framing can therefore be considered as a core mechanism 
in the democratic process as it allows political elites to control the discourse on particular 
issues, thus determining public opinion (Entman, 1993; Zeller, 1992). It is for that reason 
that this research will focus on the frames adopted by the Bush administration, in 
particular those relating to a rhetoric of fear, in understanding why high initial levels of 
public support were not sustainable throughout the campaign. 
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IV. Research Design 
 
The research proposes the application of quantitative content analysis of US soft power 
strategies, defined for the sake of this study as presidential rhetoric, as employed by 
President Bush in analysing the case study of the Iraq War. More specifically, this 
research will analyse and evaluate how President Bush utilised the rhetoric of ‘fear’, as 
identified and introduced in chapter two of this paper as the prominent frame utilised by 
the administration in discussing  the Iraq War, and the consequences, both positive and 
negative, of this rhetoric strategy for public support levels. This research is specifically 
intended to test the input of various elements in constructing a rhetoric of fear and the 
extent to which such rhetoric was successful in achieving the goals of support 




Using the software Wordsmith for computer based analysis combined with manual 
methods, a word frequency analysis was conducted on the transcribed text of President 
Bush’s weekly presidential radio broadcasts2 for the duration of his presidency from 
                                                          
2 White house archives – President Bush’s Weekly Radio Addresses: https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/radio/ 
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January 20th 2001 through to January 20th 2009 (n = 418). Word frequency analysis was 
conducted only on terms identified through previous studies to constitute a rhetoric of 
fear. These are listed as: “terror”, “terrorism”, references to “terrorist threats”, terrorist 
leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, “WMDs”, “murder”, and 
“fear” along with references to attempts by the United States to promote “peace” and 
“security” (Dimaggio, 2015, 120).  Due to problems of contextualising computer based 
word frequency lists, reference to WMDs were considered present when reference to 
“weapons” occurred in conjunction with references to “biological”, “chemical”, “nuclear” 
or “mass destruction”. Moreover, counts of “peace” and “security” are considered as 
proxy for reference to US attempts to promote peace and stability in the region. Thus the 
unit of analysis was word frequency count of reference to fearful rhetoric. Finally this 
study additionally accounted for references to the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 
as a review of the existing literature has identified this as a critical event in influencing 
public opinion and susceptibility to a rhetoric of fear. This was achieved through 
identification of the occurrence of “September” in conjunction with “eleven” or 
“eleventh” in Presidential radio addresses in computer based analysis. 
Whilst the umbrella term used here of Bush’s “rhetoric of fear” is referring to the theme 
of fear in presidential rhetoric as a functioning mechanism intended to incite within the 
public great emotions and increased threat perception, leading to greater susceptibility 
to presidential calls to action, ‘fear’ as a term included within word frequency counts is 
rather considered, along with ‘murder’ to be terms indicating attempts by the President 
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to stoke anxiety within the US public by suggesting action and sentiment created in the 
victims of Presidential narratives (Dimaggio, 2015, 120). 
Two data sets were developed using computer based word frequency analysis. The first 
recorded total counts of the rhetoric of fear based upon the terms identified above, whilst 
the second data set aims to control for the use of fearful rhetoric used in reference to Iraq 
by only considering word frequency counts of such terms occurring in radio broadcasts 
that also directly refer to “Iraq” (n = 141). The results of both data sets are presented in 
chapter five The decision to include both controlled and uncontrolled data sets was taken 
in order to evaluate the extent to which Iraq dominated the rhetoric of fear, and also to 
suggest whether the rhetoric of fear was a tool used only in references to Iraq or as part 
of a broader narrative. Finally alongside computer based data, manual word frequency 
analysis was also conducted in order to add improved elements of validity to the data. 
Despite advantages in terms of context and validity when conducting manual analysis, 
computer based analysis holds advantages in terms of reliability, thus combining both 
methods is intended to improve both the reliability and validly of the study 
(Pashakhanlou, 2017). 
Alongside the development of data presenting the overall occurrence of fearful rhetoric 
across the duration of Bush’s presidency, word frequency data for the specific terms 
constituting a rhetoric of fear is also presented in figures 14 through to 22 in chapter five. 
Such data allows for deeper analysis of the frames and elements used in the creation of 
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a rhetoric of fear, and permits for analysis of the trends in this over time. This will be 
addressed in more detail in chapters five and six. 
 
2. The Weekly Radio Address of the President of the United 
States 
 
As stated above, this study takes Presidential Radio Broadcasts as the object of analysis. 
The Weekly Address of the President of the United States is a short, weekly speech 
delivered by the President to the nation. President Bush also introduced the release of 
Presidential Radio Addresses in podcast form alongside standard radio broadcasts. 
Presidential radio broadcasts were selected as the data source for this study for several 
reasons. Firstly, they offer a consistent overview of presidential rhetoric as they are for 
the most part of a similar length, and are broadcast on a regular weekly schedule for the 
full duration of Bush’s presidency. Secondly, as this research wishes to focus on 
presidential rhetoric and not media coverage and framing of the president’s message, , 
presidential radio broadcasts allow such a direct communication of presidential rhetoric 
as it would have been received by the target audience – the US domestic public. As 
President Bush lamented that a media “filter” prevented Americans from getting “the 
truth” about Iraq, analysis of Presidential Radio Broadcasts allows this study to focus on 
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presidential narrative and rhetoric in isolation from such a media filter, thus controlling 
for the effects of media coverage on official rhetoric (Dimaggio, 2015, 116). 
Finally, data suggests that even as recently as 2017, American radio listenership remains 
high. Schmidt (2018) reported that 90% of Americans over the age of twelve listened to 
AM/FM radio at least once a week, and that 57% of online radio listeners were also 
tuning in at least once per week. The report furthermore, cites a study from Edison 
Research which found that podcast listenership was continuing to grow (Schmidt, 2018). 
Therefore, whilst data specifically regarding listenership for presidential radio 
broadcasts is not available, such data does suggest that in general, radio broadcast 
remained a relevant way to reach large portions of the US population. 
 
3. Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis can be used for several purposes and in addressing various types of 
research questions. This include questions regarding the antecedents of communications, 
or questions of by whom and why such communication methods are used, to describe 
and make inferences about the characteristics of communications – the ‘how’ and ‘what’ 
questions – and to make inferences about the effects of communications – the question 
of ‘with what effect’? (Holsti, 1969). It is with regards to the latter groups of questions, 
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how and with what effect that this study shall aim to employ quantitative content analysis 
in addressing the research questions proposed in chapter one. 
Whilst computer based content analysis has become increasingly employed due to 
associated increases in reliability, manual analysis is still considered useful when dealing 
with latent meaning as humans are considered to maintain an “interpretive edge over 
computers” (Pashakhanlou, 2017, 449). As such, despite potential drawbacks in 
reliability manual content analysis is still considered well suited for inquiries dealing 
with how and why questions alongside what questions (Pashakhanlou, 2017, 449). 
Therefore, in order to address some criticisms of computer based quantitative analysis 
in terms of contextualisation, interpretation, and validity, and to achieve the highest 
possible combination of validity and reliability in this study, a combination of computer 
based and manual content analysis has been employed in addressing the use of a rhetoric 
of fear by President Bush. 
Moreover, elements of qualitative analysis will be employed within the interpretation of 
data covered in chapter six in order to supplement the analysis by adding the necessary 
interpretation, contextualisation, and validity required to further mitigate some of the 
shortcomings of quantitative content analysis (Pashakhanlou, 2017, 452). Qualitative 
elements of content analysis are considered favourable to a combination of quantitative 
content analysis and other forms of qualitative analysis such as discourse analysis when 
the aim is to reduce the data to study systematically, rather than opening it up to analyse 
holistically, and aiming to arrive at a single interpretation rather than providing multiple 
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readings by focussing on what is in the material rather than silences (Pashakhanlou, 2017, 
452). As such, this was considered to be the optimum method for this research where 
only the rhetoric of fear, and not other presidential frames will be analysed, and where 
the sheer volume of data covered makes it impossible to cover adequately through in-
depth, qualitative methods. 
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V. Word Frequency Counts of ‘Fear’ & its Composite 
Elements in Presidential Radio Addresses (2001 – 2009) 
 
This chapter will present the results of computer and manual based word frequency 
analysis and will thus address the question of how a rhetoric of fear was created and 
employed in George W. Bush’s presidential radio addresses. The first section of the 
chapter will provide an overview of total counts of fearful rhetoric appearing in radio 
broadcasts by year and by month according to both computer based and manual methods 
of analysis. The latter half of this chapter will be dedicated to presenting the different 
frames and elements that constituted such rhetoric, thus allowing the identification of 
trends in terms of what elements were used to construct a rhetoric of fear at different 
points throughout the Bush presidency. This will provide a framework for analysis and 





Figure 4 shows an overview of the occurrence of fearful rhetoric in George W. Bush’s 
presidential radio addresses for the duration of his terms in office. It includes data from 
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both computer based and manual analysis. The computer based analysis has been further 
broken down into two data sets, total counts of fearful rhetoric in all presidential radio 
addresses and controlled for addresses mentioning Iraq, as introduced in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Figure 4: An overview of fearful rhetoric in Presidential Radio Addresses during the Bush presidency. 
 
From figure 4 we can see that counts of total fearful rhetoric were relatively high from 
the start of Bush’s presidency, and increased considerably in 2002, after which counts 
continued to increase steadily through to 2006. Following this there is a rapid decline in 
counts of fearful rhetoric employed in 2007 and a further decline in 2008. 2009 also 
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the end of Bush’s presidency in January 2009 meaning only three presidential radio 
addresses were broadcast that year. Counts of fearful rhetoric increased markedly 
following the September 11 attacks, and total counts of fearful rhetoric remained higher 
both than counts when controlled for mentions of Iraq and than manual counts, 
suggesting that rather than fearful rhetoric being a unique frame of Iraq War campaign, 
rather Iraq was fit into a pre-existing narrative frame of fear and threat utilised by the 
Bush administration. 
Computer based word frequency counts show that fearful language was employed to a 
significant extent from the first year of Bush’s presidency in 2001. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, as figure 5 shows, the majority of this rhetoric occurred in the latter half 
of 2001 however, following the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York’s World 
Trade Centre. Significantly, during this year there were no direct references to Iraq in 
presidential radio addresses. 
Direct references to Iraq first appeared in September of 2002. The general trend of both 
overall fearful rhetoric and that when controlled for direct references to Iraq shows an 
overall increase in utilisation of ‘fear’ from this point up until a peak in such rhetoric in 
2006. In fact, years 2003, 2005, and 2006 recorded over 300 counts of fearful language 
when controlled for addresses directly referencing Iraq. This finding is perhaps 
unsurprising as this covers the build-up to and initial phase of the Iraq campaign, and the 
period leading up to the 2004 US presidential elections. All of these would have been 
critical times in building domestic support for the president and the wars in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan constituted major items in the presidential campaigns and debates leading 
up to the 2004 elections (Levy, 2018). Moreover, according to computer based frequency 
counts, from 2003 until the end of the Bush administration, over half of the fearful 
rhetoric used in presidential radio addresses was employed in addresses which also made 
direct reference to Iraq. This shows the high salience of Iraq within presidential rhetoric 
and its position as a central element in the rhetoric of fear. 
Now I shall discuss the general trends of manual word frequency counts. These are 
noticeably lower than that of computer based counts as these were selected only where 
the fearful rhetoric was considered to be used in direct reference to Iraq, thus controlling 
for the use of similar language and frames towards other issues. 
According to manual word frequency counts, the highest concentration of fearful 
rhetoric towards Iraq occurred in 2003, the year in which the initial invasion and the bulk 
of combat operations occurred. As such, this was a critical period for the president to 
justify the need for such operations in order to win domestic public support for the 
campaign. Following this, counts remained fairly stable, hovering around the 150 mark 
through to 2006. Following this there was a drop by roughly one third in counts from 
2006 to 2007 and a further significant decrease in 2008. In the three presidential radio 
broadcasts made in 2009, no counts of fearful rhetoric used directly against Iraq were 
found through manual analysis. Manual counts remain much lower than computer based 
counts throughout the Bush administration. This suggest that either a rhetoric of fear was 
part of a broader narrative concerning more than just the Iraq war, but also as may be 
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revealed through qualitative analysis, that whilst elements of the rhetoric of fear and 
reference to Iraq were often made within a single radio address, from 2004 onwards the 
linkage of such elements to Iraq was often more nuanced and ambiguous than the direct 
linkages between ‘fear’ and Iraq made in 2002 to 2003. This will be addressed in more 
detail in chapter six 
 
2. Word Frequency Counts of Fearful Rhetoric by Year: 
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Figure 6: Word frequency counts for fearful rhetoric in presidential radio addresses in 2002 
 































Figure 8: Word frequency of fearful rhetoric from presidential radio addresses from 2004 
Direct references to Iraq did not appear in presidential radio addresses until September 
2002, one year after the September 11 attacks. In fact, the first direct mention of Iraq 
occurred on September 14th 2002, almost exactly a year to the day after the attacks. This 
timing of introduction of Iraq is very significant and appears have been a conscious 
decision adopted by the Bush administration in order to maximise the impact of a 
rhetoric of fear on the US public (Dimaggio, 2015, 62; Western, 2005). This can 
therefore be interpreted as further indirect efforts to link Iraq with the fear and threat of 
terrorism and the possibility of another direct attack on the US homeland in the minds 

















The peak in counts of fearful rhetoric in Bush’s first term in office occurred in March 
2003. This was the period of initial military operations in Iraq. Thus, the data suggests 
that an increase in utilisation of a rhetoric of fear coincided both with the bulk of combat 
operations in Iraq and with campaigns to win public support for the President in the 2004 
presidential election campaign. This suggests that President Bush used fear as an active 
soft power strategy and mechanism to gain public support for short term-goals and 
policies. 
 
Figure 9: Word frequency of fearful rhetoric from presidential radio addresses from 2005 
In terms of manual word frequency counts of the direct application of fearful rhetoric 
towards Iraq, the peak occurred in October of 2005.This was the period of Iraqi 
referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, suggesting fear may have been used in framing 


















was a significant decrease in references to Iraq and very low counts of fearful rhetoric 
employed overall within presidential radio broadcasts. Fearful rhetoric when controlled 
for references to Iraq remained low for the remainder of Bush’s presidency, only 
surpassing 20 counts in manual analysis in three months in 2006 and two months in 2007. 
Computer based frequency counts were slightly higher but still significantly lower than 
the numbers that were seen repeatedly in the first term of Bush’s presidency from 2001 
to 2004. 
Despite this, an increase was observed in computer based frequency counts in September 
2006 and in July through to September 2007. It is possible that some of this increase can 
be explained by efforts to win support for the Surge, an increase in US troop levels in 
Iraq in order to try and deal with increasing sectarian violence within the country, and 
the need to justify this to the domestic population as by this point support levels for the 
war had fallen drastically with opinion polls show that the majority of the population 
was in support of a reduction in troop levels deployed in Iraq even at the expense of civil 
order in the country (ABC News, 2007; Washington Post Poll, 2007). 
Figure 10 shows the results for word frequency counts of fearful rhetoric employed in 
2006. Peaks in total fear references when controlled for references to Iraq occurred in 
September 2006 when 109 out of 129 total counts of fearful rhetoric occurred in speeches 
referencing Iraq. Interestingly however, manual word frequency counts for this month 
remain significantly lower. This could be explained either by human error in the data 
analysis process leading to inaccurate manual work frequency counts. However, it could 
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alternatively suggest that whilst fearful rhetoric was utilised heavily in conjunction with 
references to Iraq, the linkage between Iraq and ‘fear’ was left intentionally ambiguous. 
 
















Figure 11: Word frequency of fearful rhetoric in presidential radio addresses from 2007 
In 2007, whilst seeing an overall reduction in counts of fearful rhetoric compared with 
2006, use of fearful rhetoric gradually increased from the start of the year with peaks in 
July and August and September, during which period there were increases in word 
frequency counts of ‘fear’ across all measures. Counts were particularly high in August 
and September. In August, computer based word frequency counts show that all uses of 
fearful rhetoric in that month occurred in radio addresses directly referencing Iraq, 
reflecting the deep integration of Iraq and ‘fear’ in presidential rhetoric. 
The overall decrease in counts of fearful rhetoric from October 2007 onwards continues 
through to 2008 when the highest total counts of fearful rhetoric occurred in January, 















occurred in April. According to manual counts Iraq was only directly targeted by such 
rhetoric in January, April, May, June, September, and December, and in each case only 
a couple of references were made, a significant decrease even when compared to 2007 
levels. Thus we can see that towards the end of Bush’s presidency fearful rhetoric was 
used to a significantly lesser extent. Potential explanations for this will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
Figure 12: Word frequency of fearful rhetoric in presidential radio addresses from 2008 
From mid-2004 onwards there appears to be a decreasing trend in the level of fearful 
rhetoric directed towards Iraq. Despite surges in the levels of fearful rhetoric directed 
towards Iraq in August and October 2005 these levels remain generally low throughout 
2005 before seeing an increase in 2006. By April 2006, according to computer based 
















This could be in light of increasing violence in Iraq during the US occupation of the 
country and in efforts to maintain support as the occupation and campaign drags on and 
public support levels for the President’s handling of the war decreases (Arango, 2013). 
This dominant trend continued through 2007 until October, when there was a major drop 
in all counts of fearful rhetoric both when controlled for direct reference to Iraq and in 
total counts. Whilst references to Iraq dropped further in 2008, the computer based 
analysis suggests that when discussed, addresses directly mentioning Iraq accounted for 
the overwhelming majority of counts of fearful rhetoric used by the president. Iraq 
remained central in Bush’s rhetoric of fear through to the end of his presidency in 2009, 
when in just three radio addresses made before the termination of Bush’s presidency, 
almost half the counts of fearful rhetoric occurred in speeches directly referencing Iraq 
according to computer based analysis. Despite this, manual counts suggest that no fearful 
rhetoric was directly targeted towards Iraq in 2009. 
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Figure 13: Word frequency of fearful rhetoric in presidential radio addresses from 2009 
 
3. Computer Based Quantitative Analysis by Frame 
 
This section will show the occurrence of key words relating to different themes 
considered to be components of Bush’s rhetoric of fear. The data used here is only from 
computer based word frequency counts after controlling for direct reference to Iraq. Thus 
data for 2001 has not been included as there were no direct references to Iraq in 















Figure 14: Word frequency by theme 2001-2009 
Figure 14 shows there was a consistent increase in use of rhetoric relating to terror in 
presidential radio addresses until the peak in 2006, after which references to terror 
dropped dramatically. References to security and efforts to promote peace and stability, 
indicated by “security” on the graphs, followed a similar but less dramatic trend. As year 
by year data sets also show, references to threats such as ‘terror’ or ‘WMDs’ are often 
accompanied by a simultaneous increase in references to ‘peace’ and ‘security’. The 
graph further shows that reference to WMDs, which was a major theme in the first few 
years of Bush’s presidency and the war in Iraq, quickly became insignificant, reducing 
close to zero from 2004 onwards. Finally, from 2002 onwards ‘murder’ can be 
considered a significant frame, although its salience is much lower than that of ‘fear’, 

































appeal to universal morals and the emotions of the audience within their rhetoric strategy. 
The overall trend shows a drastic decrease in all counts of fearful rhetoric post 2006, a 
trend that was consistent through to the end of Bush’s presidency. 
Figures 15 and 16 clearly show that in the lead up to and early stages of the Iraq War 
‘WMDs’ and efforts to promote ‘peace and security’ were central frames in the 
composition of Bush’s rhetoric of fear. From mid-2003 however counts of WMD 
references dropped significantly and from this point on, ‘terror’ became the central pillar 
of fearful rhetoric. For the most part, efforts to promote peace and security remained 
significant and steady. From April to June 2008 efforts to promote peace & security did 
become the dominant theme, however due to low counts of fearful rhetoric in general 
over this year this can be better understood in terms of the maintenance of this frame 
relative to a significant decrease in reference to other elements such as terrorism. 
67 
 
Figure 15: 2002 Word Frequency count by frame 
 



























































Figure 17: 2004 word frequency counts by frame 
Interestingly, from 2002 through to 2004, the data shows that increases in references to 
‘terror’ or ‘WMDs’ were often coupled by a simultaneous increase in references to 
‘security’. This supports previous findings that the combination of such frames were 
used to gain support for a policy initiative – in this case the invasion of Iraq - by 
juxtaposing the threat, the alleged existence of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction within Iraq, with the need for action and the ability of the US forces to defend 





























Figure 18: 2005 word frequency counts by frame 
 

























































Figure 19 suggests that the peak in fearful rhetoric occurring in September 2006 was 
largely due to a substantial increase in references to ‘terror’ occurring in this month. 
Word frequency counts for terrorism and related terms increased almost three fold from 
the previous month, before returning to these lower levels in October. Again this increase 
in references to terrorism was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in security 
related terms however, this increase was slight in comparison. There was also a 
simultaneous but smaller increase in references to the September 11 2001 attacks during 
this period. 
 































Figure 21: 2008 word frequency counts by frame 
In 2007 and 2008 there was an increase in references to ‘security’ relative to references 
of ‘terror’ and other frames. Due to timing, following the Surge in the start of 2007 and 
nearing the end of Bush’s presidency, it is possible that this increase in hopeful, positive 
language relative to fearful rhetoric may be an attempt to portray the campaign as 
successful as Bush’s presidency came to a close. Alternatively it could be interpreted as 
suggesting that due to Bush’s inability to run for another term in office, there was no 
longer considered a need to win support for the campaign as policy options would no 
longer be Bush’s to make, therefore the effects and constraints of public opinion  no 
longer posed such a major concern to the president. In 2008 the world suffered a major 
financial crisis and recession, therefore the common use of security to discusses issues 






























relative increase is actually due to a reduction in salience of Iraq, and an increase in other 
concerns discussed using similar language however, such differences were indiscernible 
through computer based analysis methods. 
 
Figure 22: 2009 word frequency counts by frame 
Finally, data shows that increases in uses of references to ‘terrorism’ or ‘WMDs’ in 
presidential radio addresses were accompanied by simultaneous increases in references 
to ‘peace’ and ‘security’. This was often employed through the juxtaposition of the 
‘evilness’ of terrorism or the Iraqi regime, and the ‘good’ nature of US forces and their 
mission in Iraq as exemplified in several radio broadcasts.3 As such, we can consider 
                                                          
3 Specifically radio broadcasts from March 22nd 2003, March 29th 2003, and April 5th 2003 












that the president used a rhetoric of fear not in isolation but in combination with hopeful 
rhetoric in order to both emphasise the ‘evil’ nature of the adversary, but also the need 
for the US to take action, and the justness, and legitimacy of the use of force by the 
United States. This supports Dimaggio’s observations in identifying ‘hope’ along with 





In summary, trends in the use of fearful rhetoric show that use of such rhetoric in 
presidential radio broadcasts increased steadily over the first term of George W. Bush’s 
presidency, reaching a peak in September 2006. Following this, use of such rhetoric 
decreased substantially for the remainder of the Bush presidency. Total counts of fearful 
rhetoric remained higher than when controlled for references to Iraq, and computer based 
counts remained higher than manual counts. This suggests that both Iraq was part of a 
wider rhetoric of fear which it dominated at times, and that the link between elements of 
fearful rhetoric and Iraq were not always made explicit by the administration. 
‘WMDs’ constituted a significant element in the rhetoric of fear during the first term of 
George W. Bush’s presidency but references to these decreased significantly when it 
became apparent that Iraq did not possess such capabilities. ‘Terrorism’ and the ‘war on 
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terror’ frame remained central to Bush’s rhetoric of fear throughout the war with 
elements such as ‘murder’ remaining lesser elements, but with increasing salience at 
certain points in the campaign. Finally, increases in references to ‘terror’ or ‘WMDs’ 
were often accompanied by increases in references to ‘peace’ and ‘security’, thus 
supporting the findings of previous studies (Dimaggio, 2015; Speer, 2017). The potential 
interpretations and implications of this will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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VI. Interpretation & Implications of the President’s use 
of “Fear” 
 
The previous chapter highlighted major trends in the use of fear in Bush’s presidential 
radio broadcasts in addressing the question of how a rhetoric of fear was created and 
employed by the Bush administration. This chapter will discuss influential factors in 
why such trends in the data appeared, and potential implications of the use of such 
rhetoric in order to address the questions of why and to what effect such rhetoric was 
employed. The chapter will be divided into two major sections. The first will look to 
explain the trends appearing in the data in addressing why fear was employed in such a 
way, whilst the second will address what were the implications and effects of the Bush 
administrations employment of such rhetoric strategies on both a domestic and 
international level. 
 
1. Interpreting Trends in the Data 
 
This section will examine the trends appearing in the data presented in the previous 
chapter. It is organised into two subsections, the first of which will address the high 
levels of fearful rhetoric in presidential radio broadcasts from 2001 through to 2006, 
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whilst the second section will address the subsequent rapid decline in utilisation of a 
rhetoric of fear towards the end of President Bush’s second term in office from late 2006 
through to January 2009. 
 
1-1. High use of ‘Fear’ between 2001 & 2006 
 
Firstly, I shall address the increase in use of fearful rhetoric between 2001 and 2006. 
Most significantly, this period covered the build-up to war, the initial military conflict, 
and the early stages of the US occupation of Iraq, when it was essential for the president 
to gain support for his administration’s war policies in order to successfully conduct 
operations. As concluded in various studies, fear was initially a successful driver of 
bipartisan support for the war with threat perception of Iraq amongst the US population 
high (Dimaggio, 2015; Muddiman et al, 2014). When discussing threat perception, 
capability and intent are considered two main elements central to its creation (Stein, 
2013). Through a rhetoric of fear President Bush moulded both of these elements by 
referencing Iraq’s alleged WMD program to suggest capability, and links with al Qaeda 
and the hatred of the west harboured by such terrorists as indication of Iraq’s destructive 
intent.4 Through such mechanisms, as well as repeated reference in presidential radio 
broadcasts to Iraq’s ability to obtain nuclear weapons within a year if intervention did 
                                                          
4 Examples include in Presidential radio broadcasts from September 28th 2002 & March 20th 
2004. 
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not occur, the president successfully employed fear to manipulated the threat perception 
of Iraq within the minds of the US public, securitising the issue, as a means of driving 
support for the war as the pre-emptive use of force to ensure the security of the United 
States.5 
Whilst there has been somewhat of a shift in the framing of Iraq in official rhetoric, from 
a distinct threat sharing responsibility for the September 2001 terror attacks to rather 
portraying Iraq as a central battleground in the war on terror, the main elements used in 
construction fearful rhetoric remain generally consistent. Whilst reference to WMDs in 
presidential radio broadcasts decreases significantly from mid-2003 onwards references 
to terror remain high, becoming the main driver from this point onwards. Moreover, 
following this the significant elements constituting Bush’s rhetoric of fear remain 
relatively constant. This is despite revelations that Bush had misled the public on claims 
that Iraq had links to al Qaeda and shared responsibility for the September 11th terror 
attack. This may explain the apparent decrease in susceptibility of the US public to 
rhetoric appeals to fear and the threat of terrorism. Such elements became less and less 
influential as drivers for public support as the credibility of Presidential rhetoric 
deteriorated and the public became increasingly critical towards the legitimacy of the 
war (Dimaggio, 2015, 153). 
As for why utilisation of the rhetoric of fear remained high following the initiation of 
the campaign through to 2006, this can be understood in terms of legitimising and 
                                                          
5 As indicated in radio broadcasts from September 14th 2002 & September 28th 2002. 
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justifying the need for maintaining US forces in Iraqi territory during the democracy 
building process along with countering rising criticism of President Bush in light of 
revelations that Iraq neither possessed WMDs, nor had ties to those responsible for the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001. Whilst Bush announced the end of major combat 
activities in a radio broadcast on May 3rd 2003, he maintained that there still remained 
those with links to terrorism who would work to undermine and destabilise the new 
regime, therefore requiring the presence of US forces in the country to root out such 
groups and protect the country, and by extension the United States, until a stable 
democratic regime could be established. Moreover, as the occupation continued, 
instances of violence and US troop deaths increased, and war fatigue set in it became 
increasingly important for the President to justify the need to maintain troops in Iraq in 
spite of these factors. This was particularly important as increasing media coverage of 
casualty and violence levels in Iraq were linked closely with increased public opposition 
to the war (Bourke, 2011; Francis, 2007). Thus, whilst fear may have been effective in 
winning support for the war initially, it appears to have been less successful in blunting 
such criticisms as public support levels continued to fall during this period despite 
continued emphasis on the rhetoric of fear and utilisation of the war on terror frame by 
the administration (Speer, 2017). 
Use of fearful rhetoric peaked in 2006 according to both total and controlled computer 
based word frequency counts. Whilst at this point President Bush had seen some major 
successes in the war including the capture of Iraqi terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 
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June 2006, he was facing increasing opposition at home. Such criticism included the 
argument that the stationing of US forces in Iraq was a factor behind the increasing levels 
of violence in Iraq and was actually therefore increasing the threat of terrorism (Singal 
et al., 2010). The President responded strongly to such criticism stating in a radio 
broadcast from September 30th 2006: “some in Washington have selectively quoted from 
this document to make the case that by fighting the terrorists in Iraq we are making our 
people less secure here at home. This argument buys into the enemy's propaganda that 
the terrorists attack us because we are provoking them”. In such a way the president 
attempted to discredit such criticism and the use of such methods mirrors tactics that had 
been used in the lead-up to the Iraq War, labelling those opposing the President’s calls 
for war as “unpatriotic” (Dimaggio, 2015, 80). Therefore fear and the threat of terror 
was used in attempts to counter and discredit such criticism and justify the need for the 
deployment of US forces in the country despite increasing casualty levels and domestic 
violence in Iraq. However, unlike during the build-up to war in 2002-2003, by 2006 such 
methods showed limited results in influencing public opinion (Pollak, 2006; Stewart, 
2014). 
Despite opposition, Bush announced the ‘Surge’ in January 2007, and launched 
operations in March 2007. This decision suggests that whilst public opinion may 
constrain government policy, it does not dictate it, as the Surge was conducted largely 
against the grain of public sentiment which called for the withdrawal of US troops from 
Iraq (Dimaggio, 2015, 110; Langer, 2006). The surge saw more than 20,000 additional 
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US troops deployed to Iraq in order to counter and suppress the violence occurring there 
and return stability to the region (Dubik, 2015). The surge appears to have been 
somewhat successful with instances of violence decreasing, and the initiative receiving 
an ultimately positive progress report from General Petraeus in September 2007, and the 
civil war in Iraq winding down by June 2008 (Dimmagio, 2015, 118). As such, we can 
see that the use of a rhetoric of fear appears to have been used to greatest effect by the 
administration in gaining support for short-term policy initiatives or action. Used in 
conjunction with promising hard power operations it could see temporary effects in 
facilitating policies and winning short-term support, but was ultimately less effective as 
a tool for long-term support maintenance, and was insufficient to overcome the  loss of 
credibility and overwhelming public opposition suffered by the Bush administration. 
 
1-2. Decrease in the Employment of ‘Fear’, 2007 Onwards 
 
Trends show that following the peak in 2006 the use of fearful rhetoric reduced 
dramatically in presidential radio broadcasts. As previous studies have shown, strategic 
considerations and perceptions of success were a major factor in predicting public 
support levels for the war (Dimaggio, 2015). As such, in order to attempt to maintain 
support it was important for the president to frame the war as a success. In the initial 
phases this was concerned with justifying the need for the use of force in Iraq and the 
maintenance of an occupying force once major combat activities had ceased. This 
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explains the high frequency of fearful rhetoric employed in the first term of Bush’s 
presidency and up till 2006 when the main concern can be considered selling this 
justification. As Bush’s administration drew to an end however, with no possibility of 
re-election having already served two terms in office, it was important rather to frame 
the War in a way so as to suggest progress had been made, and that something had been 
achieved in Iraq during the presidency. As such, continued use of a rhetoric of fear may 
have had an effect counter to this, by emphasising the failure of US forces to remove all 
terrorist elements from the country and to fulfil all the goals of disarming Iraq, regime 
change, ending insurgency operations and sectarian violence, and building a stable and 
functioning democracy as had been laid out in statements by the administration. 6 
Continued frequent references to such elements would only suggest the Bush 
administration had failed to achieve the goals they had put forth. Therefore, we can 
interpret the drastic reduction in counts of fearful rhetoric during the latter period of 
Bush’s second term in office as attempts to counter perceptions of lack of progress in 
the occupation. 
Whilst the most noticeable decrease in use of fearful rhetoric did not occur until the latter 
half of 2006, the data shows that generally usage of fearful rhetoric was higher in Bush’s 
first term in office than in his second. Whilst many factors contributing to this have 
already been discussed above, another potential factor contributing to this may include 
Bush’s campaign for re-election in the 2004 US presidential elections. The rhetoric of 
                                                          
6 References to U.S. goals in Iraq can be found in radio broadcasts from November 16th 2002, 
March 8th 2003, March 22nd 2003, September 18th 2004, & September 25th 2004. 
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fear can considered to have been used to drive support for specific policies including the 
initiation of the war in Iraq and the Surge in 2007. As such, it could also be used to drive 
support for Bush’s re-election campaign by emphasising the threat that could have been 
posed by Iraq had the US not initially intervened to end the Saddam Hussein regime, and 
that may re-emerge if the US was not successful in rebuilding Iraq as a functioning 
democracy friendly towards the United States. As such, the Iraq War can be considered 
a core policy of the Bush administration and central element in the 2004 election 
campaigns (Levy, 2018). Bush’s narrow success in the election, winning by 50.8%, 286 
electoral votes and one state, suggests that up to this point presidential rhetoric including 
the rhetoric of fear was sufficiently convincing and persuasive to blunt criticism of the 
President’s handling of the war during that period. 
 
2. Implications of the Rhetoric of Fear 
 
This section will address the potential implications of the employment of a rhetoric of 
fear in presidential radio addresses. As with the previous section, it will be divided into 
two subsections, firstly comparing the findings of this study with data for support levels 
for the Iraq war in addressing what effects such rhetoric had on domestic public opinion. 
The second subsection will then address briefly the potential implications of the use of 
a rhetoric of fear on the US global image. 
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2-1. Fearful Rhetoric & Support for the Iraq War 
 
As discussed previously in this study, support levels for both President Bush and for the 
Iraq War fluctuated from extremely high during the early 2000’s to extremely low by 
the end of Bush’s second term in office. Figures 23 and 24 show the increasing levels of 
opposition for the war along with factors contributing to such sentiment amongst the US 
population. Interestingly, the increasing trend of scepticism regarding the war as show 
in figure 23 reflects the general increasing trend in use of fearful rhetoric utilised by the 
president, with the absence of a decrease from 2007 onwards. Whereas usage of fearful 
rhetoric decreased from this point opposition to the war continued to increase. Moreover, 
the period of September 2006, which saw highest total counts of fearful rhetoric in 
computer based word frequency also saw some of the highest levels of scepticism 
regarding the war, especially in terms of view that ‘the war is not going well’. This would 
suggest that a rhetoric of fear was ineffective in blunting emerging opposition to the war 
over an extended period of time and thus proved an ineffective tool for long-term support 
maintenance. Moreover, such trends suggest that ‘fear’ had a diminishing effect as a 
driver of public support over time. We can term this as ‘fear fatigue’, referring to the 
reduced influence of fear on public opinion and the reduced susceptibility of the public 
to such rhetoric over time. 
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Figure 23: General Scepticism of the Iraq War (Source: Dimaggio, 2015, 111) 
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Figure 24: Reasons for War Opposition (Source: Dimaggio, 2015, 112) 
The findings of this research support the conclusions of previous studies that despite 
continued employment the rhetoric of fear became less effective over time in cultivating 
and maintaining support for the war (Dimaggio, 2015, 157). Moreover, US public 
opinion regarding the war shows elements of both democratic and elite theory. 
Following democratic theory, Americans displayed rational characteristics with growing 
opposition to war appearing as a function of engagements with real-world events in Iraq, 
shown by increasing media coverage of violence and casualty levels in the war. 
Conversely, in line with elite theory, many Americans were manipulated into accepting 
government rhetoric regarding the 2005 Iraqi elections and the surge – narratives which 
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dominated media coverage at the expense of other views. Thus, by consuming one-sided 
information on these events, Americans had difficulty considering counter narratives 
that questioned presidential rhetoric (Dimaggio, 2015, 157). It is therefore evident that 
presidential rhetoric alone is not enough to guarantee and maintain support for a policy 
– rather, it is most successful when it provides the dominant voice, obscuring competing 
narratives and thus dulling the rational capabilities of the domestic population to 
consider alternative realities and frames. This shows the importance of free press, and 
critical approaches to reporting in allowing a democratic public to make rational 
decisions. Moreover, it shows the importance for leaders and politicians to gain the 
support of the media in mobilizing and maintaining public support. 
There may be arguments that the employment of fearful rhetoric was still somewhat 
successful in influencing public opinion during the later year of the Iraq war, if to a lesser 
extent than in the early years of Bush’s presidency. Figure 25 shows that around the time 
of September 2006, the period that saw the highest counts of fearful rhetoric according 
to computer based analysis, saw a temporary, short-term decrease in views that the US 
had made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq. However, such decrease in opposition was 
short lived, suggesting that despite its temporary effect, increased use of fearful rhetoric 
was insufficient to stem the momentum of increasing opposition for the War and 
President Bush’s handling of it. 
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Figure 25: US Public Opinion - did the US make a mistake in sending troops to Iraq (Source: The 
Economist, 2010) 
In discussing factors for effective soft power strategies Taylor (2010, 162) states that 
“strategic communications to be effective must be credible” and must assume a 
defensible policy, respectable identity, and core value. It can be argued that President 
Bush’s rhetoric lost credibility when it was discovered that Iraq neither possessed 
WMDs, nor had links with the al Qaeda terrorists responsible for the attacks of 
September 11th 2001 (Dimaggio, 2015, 68). Moreover research suggests that 
considerations that the war was illegal and provoking increased levels of violence in Iraq 
challenged the respectable identity and core values of many American’s who had 
previously supported the war as a humanitarian mission both to protect the United States, 
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but also to help those innocent Iraqi citizens who were reported as suffering under the 
tyranny of Saddam Hussein’s regime (US Department of State, undated). As such, core 
foundations of the rhetoric of fear had been undermined and thus the same rhetoric that 
had been so effective in winning support in the early years of the campaign had lost its 
power of persuasion over the US population. Coupled with the loss of credibility of the 
Bush regime and his rhetoric campaign as discussed above, moral norms were 
strengthened and led to the increase in domestic public opposition on the basis of moral 
and strategic considerations (Dimaggio, 2015, 146). Finally, once such rhetoric had been 
discredited, the mechanisms of ‘fear’ were no longer effective for sustaining or further 
driving support for the administration. Thus despite consistency in the levels of fearful 
rhetoric employed by President Bush for the majority of the US occupation of Iraq, 
domestic public support levels continued to fall. 
 
2-2.  ‘Fear’ & the US Global Image 
 
Whilst this paper is interested predominantly in the domestic effects of President Bush’s 
employment of a rhetoric of fear, it is worth noting that such rhetoric also had potential 
consequences reaching well outside of the borders of United States territory. Combined 
with the US’ enduring grand strategy of ‘primacy’, and with components of the ‘Bush 
Doctrine’, the US has become viewed increasingly as war prone, and even as a threat to 
global stability (Pew Research Center, 2008b; Porter, 2018; Singh, 2006; Taylor, 2010). 
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The use of fearful rhetoric can be considered to have heightened such perceptions 
through two interrelated mechanisms. Firstly, through increasing domestic audience cost, 
along with the use of dichotic language and emphasising the need to strike against 
terrorists in linking Iraq with the war on terror, Bush’s use of a rhetoric of fear added 
credibility to his threats of the use of force in the Middle East (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 
2001). This may have been advantageous in terms of coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis 
Saddam Hussein, and in adding credibility to threats of military action if Hussein did not 
comply with UNSC resolutions, however it also reinforced the view of United States as 
war prone, and even ‘imperialist’ in the eyes of some including traditional European 
allies. In fact, according to polls conducted by the Arab American Institute in 2007 68% 
of Saudi Arabians, 70% of the population of the UAE, 76% of the Lebanese population, 
83% of Egyptians, and 96% of Jordanians had a negative view of the US role in Iraq 
(Arab American Institute, 2007). Moreover, a Pew Global Attitudes Project Report 
found that majorities in numerous countries including the Netherlands, Germany, France, 
Russia, China, Canada, Poland, Pakistan, and Turkey among others believed that the 
world had been safer before the Iraq War and the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
(Pew Research Center, 2004). 
Secondly, whilst the use of fearful rhetoric may have given Bush the legitimacy within 
the US to condone the use of force in Iraq without concrete evidence of Iraqi weapons 
programs or links to terrorist groups, it did not have the same effect on a global audience. 
A 2007 BBC World Service poll suggested that 73% of the global population 
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disapproved of the US handling of the Iraq war and believed that the U.S should 
withdraw its forces from the country (BBC, 2007). Thus such rhetoric may have 
contributed to an image of the US as war mongering and disregarding of international 




Throughout the duration of Bush’s Presidency Iraq was linked to the war on terror. As 
the war developed however it was transformed from an isolated threat sharing 
responsibility for the devastation of the September 11th terror attacks, to a central front 
in the war on terror. As such, links to the war on terror frame and the salience of fearful 
rhetoric remained high for the majority of the War and subsequent occupation of Iraq, 
declining only eventually following the 2007 surge and subsequent winding down of the 
Iraq Civil War and decrease in instances of violence in the country. 
The political implications of the rhetoric of fear were significant: political officials can 
more easily manipulate those paralysed by fear. As such, when presidential rhetoric and 
media reporting overemphasised terrorist threats, the public became overly paranoid and 
more susceptible to influence from rhetoric emphasising such threats. This increased 
attention to terrorism was associated with decreased dissent against the administration 
(Dimaggio, 2015, 96). It can be considered that it was through such mechanisms, at least 
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initially, that President Bush was able to win high levels of support for the Iraq War. As 
such, support was high in the early days of the war, before the loss of credibility of 
presidential rhetoric following the failure to find WMDs and revelation that the President 
had misled the public in linking Iraq to al Qaeda terrorists in justifying the war. 
Thus, whilst fear alone was ineffective to maintain support levels the long-term it does 
however appear to have been effective in winning support initially, suggesting the 
possible application for such rhetoric strategies in support mobilisation for specific, 
short-term policy initiatives. Moreover, through such ability to drive domestic support 
and increase audience costs, it may also have application in external posturing and 
adding credibility to threats, thus potentially forming a tool for coercive diplomacy on 
an international level when employed by democratic actors (Art & Cronin, 2003; Fearon, 
1994; Lord, 1989). 
In summary, a rhetoric of fear may have effectively been used as a short-term, support 
mobilisation strategy by the Bush administration, capitalising on existing fears within 
the American population following the devastation caused by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001. Such rhetoric strategies were less effective however for long-term 
support maintenance due in part to a loss of credibility for both the Bush regime itself 
and of core elements of such rhetoric, thus critically undermining the persuasive power 
of the rhetoric of fear, and due to difficulties in effectively balancing between sustaining 
an atmosphere of fear sufficient to justify the maintenance of US forces in Iraq in the 
face of reports of violence and other scandals, whilst not undermining progress made in 
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the campaign. Finally, whilst such rhetoric may have been successful in initial support 
mobilisation for the war amongst the US domestic audience, on the international stage it 
can be argued that it rather contributed to existing perceptions of the US as war prone 
and a threat to international peace and stability, stemming from the US long-standing 
grand strategy of primacy and Bush’s perceived preference for pre-emptive use of force 





In concluding this paper, this chapter shall first summarise the main findings of this 
research with relation to the research questions proposed in chapter one along with the 
conceptual frameworks upon which this study has been constructed. Following this the 
limitations of the study will be addressed and avenues for future research will be 
suggested. 
 
1. Summary of Research Findings 
 
This paper opened with the proposal of the following research questions: 
1. How was a rhetoric of fear created and utilised in George W. Bush’s presidential radio 
broadcasts and what were the major implications of the employment of such rhetoric? 
2. How effective was a rhetoric of fear in mobilising and maintaining support for the 
Iraq War? 
In addressing the first research question, quantitative data found that a rhetoric of fear 
was not solely a strategy directed towards the war in Iraq, but rather was employed 
heavily following the attacks of September 11th 2001 towards perceived terrorists threats. 
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Once Iraq had been introduced into the narrative of the war on terror in September 2002 
however, it became a central pillar of such a narrative. As the campaign progressed, the 
administration’s framing of Iraq shifted from a direct and imminent threat to a central 
front in the war on terror. Nonetheless, despite shifts in frame, ‘terror’ remained a major 
element in forming the rhetoric of fear. At the outset, reference to WMDs also comprised 
a major element in the rhetoric of fear, however this decreased sharply following the 
failure to find evidence of Iraqi WMDs and terror thus became the central pillar of 
presidential rhetoric. The data presented in figures 14 to 22 also supports the findings of 
previous studies, that a rhetoric of fear was juxtaposed with elements of ‘hope’, that the 
US would take action to eliminate such threats (Dimaggio, 2015). As such, a rhetoric of 
fear was created through frequent and repeated references to ‘threats’ such as that of 
terrorism and WMDs, increasing the salience of such issues within presidential rhetoric. 
This was used in combination with ‘hope’ to mobilise support for the War. 
The implications of the rhetoric of fear were numerous. Initially, a fearful population 
was easier to influence thus allowing President Bush to gain high levels of support for 
the war both within the White House and amongst the American public (DiMaggio, 2010; 
Dimaggio, 2015, 96; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). However, as the occupation 
continued, under increasing opposition and a loss of credibility, the president suffered 
walking a tightrope between emphasising terrorist threats in order to maintain and 
rebuild support for the occupation, and emphasising hope and Iraq’s progress towards a 
functioning democracy in portraying success in the war. This suggests the need to 
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balance between strategic and moral considerations both of which were found in 
previous studies to have been powerful drivers of public opposition to the war (Dimaggio, 
2015). 
Moreover, such rhetoric did nothing for America’s global image with polls showing even 
US allies were critical of the US role in Iraq and in effecting global peace and stability 
even prior to the war (Pew Research Center, 2004, Pew Research Center 2008). Thus, 
domestically a rhetoric of fear was effective in mobilising public with elements of 
plausibility and logic being powerful enough to drive support despite lack of evidence 
supporting key claims. However, the rhetoric of fear appeared to yield a decreased rate 
of return over time as the audience began to suffer from ‘fear fatigue’ therefore once 
credibility had been lost, repeated utilisation of such rhetoric was insufficient to regain 
domestic support. Moreover, it appears that whilst a domestic audience was found to 
respond to a narrative that was both plausible and logical without the need for validity, 
the same cannot be said for the international audience, which criticised the US for acting 
without concrete evidence of Iraqi WMDs or ties to al Qaeda (Fisher, 1984). This 
suggests therefore, that the requirements for successful rhetoric strategies directed 
towards domestic and international audiences may be different. Whilst the narrative 
element of validity does not appear to be an essential element in domestic support 
mobilisation, its role in support maintenance or support mobilisation towards a foreign 
audience may be much more significant. Therefore the different elements required to 
gain domestic versus global support, along with support mobilisation versus support 
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maintenance may be potential avenues for further research into soft power and support 
mobilisation strategies. In such a way this research has contributed to our understanding 
of the framing of the Iraq War through an analysis of ‘fear’ as a political strategy 
therefore offering conclusions and lessons that can be applied to other cases in order to 
draw further conclusions regarding the usage of ‘fear’ as a mechanism for support 
mobilisation and influencing public sentiment. Other potential applications may include 
analysing the use of ‘fear’ Trump’s presidential campaign in the 2016 US elections or 
Britain’s Brexit campaign among others. 
Thus, in addressing the second research question of the effectiveness of ‘fear’ in 
mobilising and maintaining support for the war we find that whilst such rhetoric 
strategies were highly effective in short-term support mobilisation they were less 
effective for long-term support maintenance. Thus, despite high approval ratings and 
bipartisan support in 2002-2003, by Bush’s second term support levels had dropped 
across the board and partisan differences had become much more evident (Dimaggio, 
2015; Mudimann et al, 2014). Such early levels of support for the war can be considered 
“rational” in that such an outcome was entirely predictable in the pro-war informational 
environment that existed in early 2003 (Dimaggio, 2015, 102). 
It can therefore be concluded that under the unique domestic environment in which the 
US found itself following the September 11th terror attacks, a rhetoric of fear built upon 
the threat of further devastating attacks was an effective tool to win support for the war. 
Fear was not an effective tool however, for maintaining support during a long and violent 
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occupation, coverage of which challenged both moral norms and values of the US 
population, and considerations that the war was just in cause and conduct (Guthrie & 
Quinlan, 2010). The effectiveness of ‘fear’ in support mobilisation relied heavily on 
perspective of imminent threat, which in its nature, cannot be sustained indefinitely. 
Moreover, once central arguments used to justify the war had been discredited, the 
President suffered a loss of credibility that continued use of fearful rhetoric based on the 
same elements as had been used initially, was unable to overcome. 
In relating the findings of this study to the wider issue of why the US is struggling in 
modern warfare, one may conclude that whilst the use of fearful rhetoric was well 
orchestrated as an active soft power strategy designed to mobilise support for an initial 
use of force in Iraq, the strategy was suboptimal as a tool for support maintenance. 
Consequently, a lack of flexibility and adaptability within President Bush’s rhetoric 
strategy may be considered a contributing factor to the US sub-par performance in the 
Iraq War campaign. Adaptability is accepted as a central element for successful hard 
power or conventional military operations, thus we can surmise that the same is true with 
regards to soft power strategies (Dickerson, 2003; Murray, 2009). Whilst decreasing 
public support levels may not have dictated government policy in the war, it undoubted 
proved an obstacle and constraint, further handicapping the government in managing a 
difficult occupation and democracy building operations (Dimaggio, 2015, 109; Sobel, 
2001). 
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This study therefore has not only contributed to our understanding of framing and 
rhetoric in the Iraq War through offering a political science perspective to a field largely 
dominated by communications theories. In such a way this research has aimed to look 
deeper into how fear was used as a rhetoric strategy rather than analysing how the media 
has framed the war and the nexus between official rhetoric and media reporting, thus 
offering insight that may be valuable for policy makers and future political science 
studies. Furthermore, through offering a practical case study and quantifiable data this 
study has also aimed to contribute to the discourse on the concept of ‘soft power’, 
through a focus on the practical implications of  soft power strategies thus addressing a 
deficiency in the discourse on this topic (Roselle et al., 2014, 71). Finally, this research 
has offered a base for further research by highlighting underlying mechanisms and 
potential explanations for the ineffectiveness of a rhetoric of fear in the Iraq War. Thus 
future research may aim to build upon these findings through the exploration of whether 
there are conditions under which a rhetoric of fear may be effective over the long-term 
and under which ‘fear fatigue’ can be mitigated, or whether as this case suggests fear is 




2. Limitations & Avenues for Future Research 
 
The major limitations of this research relate to the quantitative nature of the analysis 
conducted. Computer based quantitative methods, whilst invaluable in generating 
reliable quantitative data, lack context and thus, whilst the results of such processes may 
be reliable they may lack in validity. This research has attempted to account for this by 
including manual quantitative alongside computer based word frequency data. However, 
whilst such manual analysis may add context and thus validity to study, it is open to 
human error and discretion and therefore lacks greatly in reliability. Furthermore, whilst 
qualitative elements are included in this study, the foundation of analysis is quantitative 
in nature there have been those who argue that many significant issues in international 
relations can only be addressed by detailed analyses unable to be obtained through 
quantitative methods (Jervis, 1967). Therefore, a possible avenue for future research 
could be a further analysis of presidential rhetoric based more heavily on qualitative 
research methods. 
Jervis further criticises the used of frequency as an indicator of importance in 
quantitative content analysis, arguing that reasons why a word appears more than others 
may have nothing to do with its significance (Jervis, 1967). Whilst the validity of this 
observation cannot be denied, it can be argued that the target word choice observed in 
the word frequency data used in this study does designate significance, as word choice 
was made based upon terms found through previous study to have significance for this 
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avenue of research. Moreover, despite Jervis’ assertions, other studies have suggested 
that frequency can be a viable indicator of significance and importance, thus supporting 
the use of such methods of research (Entman, 1993, 53). 
Several potential avenues for further research have already been proposed here including 
a qualitative study of presidential rhetoric strategies, studies testing the ‘soft power 
dilemma’ and the different factors influential in mobilising domestic versus international 
support, and a further examination of the different elements necessary for support 
mobilisation versus support maintenance. Other potential avenues  further research 
include a comparative study of similar rhetoric strategies applied to another case study 
to test if the findings of this study were unique to the situation of the Iraq War or whether 
they may be applied more broadly, and to also test the extent to what extent audience 
priming in the form of public sensitivity to references to the threat of terrorism were 
influential in the effectiveness of a rhetoric of fear following the September 11th 2001 
attacks on New York’s World Trade Center. Finally, further analysis of a rhetoric of fear, 
including significantly if there are any situations in which ‘fear’ can be sustained as a 
long-term strategy for support maintenance would build upon and further develop the 
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Appendix 1. Rothman’s Continuous Power (Rothman, 2011, 51) 
 







'공포'와 이라크 전쟁: 
2001 년부터 2009 년 사이 미국 대통령의 이라크 전쟁 관련 
수사에 관한 내용 분석 
 




이 연구는 이라크 전쟁 유지와 지지를 이끌기 위한 전략으로서 미국 대통령 
발언에서 나타나는 '두려움'의 사용을 분석하였다. 대통령 발언의 전략을 
연구하기 위해 2001년 1월부터 2009년 1월 사이에 대통령 라디오 방송에서 
나온 대통령 미사여구에 대한 정량적 콘텐츠 분석을 했다. 이 분석은 
'테러'와 대량살상무기의 위협이 공포의 미사여구를 조성하는 데 있어서 
중심 요소였다는 점을 보여준다. 대통령 라디오 방송 내에서 이러한 요소들은 
중동의 평화와 안보를 증진시키는 미국의 역할과도 병행되었다. 이 연구는 
다음과 같은 사실을 발견하였다. 2001년 9월 11일 테러 공격 이후 미국 
내에서 조성된 매우 민감해진 환경에서 '공포'는 단기 정책에 대한 대중의 
지지를 동원하는 데 매우 효과적인 도구였다. 그러나 유연성과 적응력이 
떨어져 부시 대통령이 겪었던 신뢰성과 정통성의 손실을 극복하는 데는 
효과가 없었다. 따라서 장기적인 지지를 유지하기 위한 전략으로 효과를 
보지 못하였다. 이 연구에서 미사여구 전략은 단기 지지를 받기 위해서는 
적응과 검증은 필요하지 않지만 장기적인 지지를 성공적으로 유지하기 
위해서는 적응과 검증이 필요하다는 것을 밝혀냈다. 
